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Abstract 
 
     This paper examines the equity market response to firms’ disclosure of human rights violation 
risk with regard to conflict mineral usage as required by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the 
Act). This paper assesses the aggregate equity market response to regulatory events leading to the 
passage of the Act, the equity market reaction to voluntary early disclosures and mandatory 
disclosures of conflict mineral information in Form SD, as well as the determinants of the equity 
market response. Using a sample of 4,399 US registrants from January 1, 2008 to September 30, 
2014, we document a significant negative stock market reaction to the passage of the Act and to 
conflict minerals disclosures on Form SD. The equity market reaction is more negative and limited 
to companies that source their minerals from conflict zones, companies with human rights 
violations, and companies with ambiguous disclosures. Taken together, the results of this study 
provide an economic justification for companies with poor conflict minerals practices to improve 
in order to avoid high costs that will arise if firms are forced to disclose human rights abuses. This 
paper also provides preliminary evidence that Form SD is successful in reducing the governance 
gap that exposes investors to unnecessary sanction, litigation and reputation risk from firms’ 
activities in conflict minerals usage. 
  
Key words: Human Rights, Dodd-Frank Act, Corporate Disclosure, Conflict Minerals, Corporate 
Social Responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
The mining of rare minerals by armed groups under conditions of human rights abuses in the 
eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries has been 
occurring since May 1997, and continuous conflict has led to the death of about 5 million people 
in the region (Ochoa and Keenan, 2011). The minerals at the root of the conflict are called “conflict 
minerals” defined in Section 1502(e)(4) of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereafter, the Act) as “(1) 
columbite-tantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore from which tantalum is extracted); 
cassiterite (the metal ore from which tin is extracted); gold; wolframite (the metal ore from which 
tungsten is extracted); or their derivatives; or (2) any other mineral or its derivatives determined 
by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the DRC or an adjoining country.” These 
minerals are widely used in commonly used products such as electronic components and circuit 
boards, tools, jet engine components, jewelry, wires, electrodes and electrical contacts. The 
conflict involves local militias, military groups, Congolese and Rwandan rebels and the Congolese 
army who fight to win control over the countries’ rich mineral deposits, and in the process 
murdering and raping civilians.1 The situation can be regarded as one of the deadliest conflicts 
since World War II. Despite its vast mineral resources valued at around 24 trillion dollars, which 
is equal to the combined GDP of the United States and Europe2, the DRC is ranked among the 
poorest countries in the world3456 and the lowest on the 2012 U.N. Human Development Index7. 
This is mainly because the DRC is hardly to be benefited from these valuable mineral resources. 
                                                             
1 BSR (2010). “Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Responsible Action in Supply Chains, Government 
Engagement and Capacity Building. http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Conflict_Minerals_and_the_DRC.pdf 
2 United Nations Environment Programme (2011). “UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo's Potential as Environmental Powerhouse 
but Warns of Critical Threats” http://www.unep.org/NEWSCENTRE/default.aspx?DocumentId=2656&ArticleId=8890 
3 These minerals include oil, rubber, gold, copper, uranium, diamonds, cassiterite, wolframite, tantalum, and cobalt (Seay, 2012). 
4 See http://www.gfmag.com/component/content/article/119-economic-data/12537-the-poorest-countries-in-the-world.html 
5 See http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 
6 See http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf 
7 See https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-1-Human-Development-Index-and-its-components/wxub-qc5k 
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As reported by United Nation (2005), throughout the period 1993 to 2003 – as well as before and 
after – the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was characterized by extensive corruption, 
fraud, pillage, mismanagement and lack of transparency. Political, military and business elites, as 
well as rebel groups and armies of neighboring countries, plundered these resources and got rich 
off the back of the Congolese population. Initially, in 1990s, the conflict in DRC region appeared 
to be driven primarily by political, ethnic factors. However, the exploitation of natural resources 
became increasingly attractive as the parties became more entrenched. Along with the fierce war, 
the profit derived by the exploitation of these mineral resources serve as the catalyst of the war 
efforts as well as the source of personal enrichment. Finally, The conflict can be regarded as a 
"war for profit"(Amnesty International, 2003. p.10). Given that the majority of mines in the eastern 
DRC are controlled by armed groups and that millions of people in that country depend in some 
way on the minerals trade, the result is debt bondage slavery, child labor, and sexual slavery, 
consequences particularly heinous for women and children.8Many of these conflicts are covertly 
or overtly supported by corporations whose products rely on conflict minerals, and extends to other 
countries and other industries. For example, Platform, a London-based non-government 
organization monitoring the oil and gas industry accused Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L) in 2011 of 
funding armed gangs and government forces to torture and kill Nigerians in the swamps of the 
Niger Delta.9  
The troubling statistics of the number of deaths in the DRC and the associated atrocities, have 
resulted in a public call for legislation to regulate companies’ supply chains and reduce the usage 
of conflict minerals that are likely to cause human rights violation. Despite its reluctance to use its 
                                                             
8 Open Square Foundation (2015). Free the slaves. The Congo Report. Slavery in Conflict Minerals.  
https://www.freetheslaves.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/The-Congo-Report-English.pdf 
9 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/03/nigeria-shell. 
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power to direct social change, the SEC responded to the call, and on July 21, 2010, Section 1502 
of the Act was introduced which requires mandatory disclosure on conflict minerals usage for all 
US registered firms, on a new form (Form SD) no later than May 31, 201410. The main purpose of 
the Act is to cut the supply of funds to armed groups and stop the human rights atrocities committed 
by these groups. This study examines the equity market reaction to the passage and implementation 
of this new piece of legislation. 
Anecdotal evidence presents mixed views on the passage of the conflict minerals Act. The 
views of proponents such as non-profit organizations, like Save the Congo, The Enough Project, 
and Solutions for Hope, are consistent with the “doing well by doing good” hypothesis. In their 
opinion, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act links human rights to firm performance, and 
encourages companies to exercise due diligence in managing their supply chains in a manner that 
avoids human rights abuse (ICAR, 2014). They believe that decreased use of conflict minerals will 
reduce support to armed groups, cutting off financial resources that fuel the ongoing conflict in the 
covered zone (Sarfaty,2013).  
Opponents of the legislation include many companies and their stakeholders are concerned 
about the additional compliance costs. The SEC Chairman herself questions the use of the SEC’s 
power to mandate disclosure “directed at exerting societal pressure on companies to change 
behavior, rather than to disclose financial information that primarily informs investment decisions” 
(SEC, 2013). The SEC estimates initial compliance costs of 3 to 4 billion dollars (Woody, 2012) 
with an additional 200-400 million dollars for continuous compliance (Sarfaty, 2013). In order to 
evade the high cost, some companies may choose the options of delisting from US stock exchange 
                                                             
10 Since the initial deadline may 31, 2014 falls on Saturday, the SEC extended the deadline to Monday, June 2, 2014 
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because only companies listed in US are subjected to the conflict mineral disclosure. For example, 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1978 has imposed out-of-pocket jurisdiction and other 
compliance costs on US regulated companies, which provide an incentive for non-U.S. companies 
to delist or not to offer or register from US market (Ministry of Justice, 2010). However, this time 
companies are reluctant to choose this option in that delisting from US Stock Market will incur 
risks and costs as well. As Section 1502 has set an example for business regulation on human 
rights, other regions such as European countries and Canada would like to follow suit. On June 15, 
2015, the draft of EU conflict minerals regulation was voted by the European Parliament 
Committee on International Trade (INTA)(Dynda & Kate, 2015). Similarly, the Bill-C-486 has 
been proposed by Paul Dewar in Canada. As a result, in the long run, companies are not likely to 
be exempt from the costs and risks if they move to another country. Another problem is 
exacerbated because it might still be impossible to do 100% due diligence, even with significant 
financial outlay (Mary, 2010). However, costs would be imposed, not just on companies, but also 
on countries. Some sociologists assert that the Act will not ease the present conflict in the DRC, 
but might instead hurt the economy and intensify the conflict between its government and rebel 
groups (Seary, 2012).  Additionally, if the new legislation discourages companies from importing 
minerals from the DRC, resulting in an embargo in the region, certified suppliers would be hurt as 
well as the DRC economy (Dominic, 2010). In the end, Lynn (2011) argues, the new legislation is 
focussed on achieving social and public policy goals, rather than protecting shareholder wealth. 
In this paper we revisit the unresolved issue of the value relevance of CSR disclosures by 
focussing on human rights disclosures. Specifically, we provide joint evidence on the effectiveness 
of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and on the SEC’s implementation of the Act which is the 
SEC’s first attempt at legislating human rights disclosures.Given the division among stakeholders 
5 
 
regarding the benefits pf the Act, it is clear that the answer to the question of whether Section 1502 
provides material information is an empirical one.  
The disclosure requirements of the Act are special and uniquely different from other disclosures 
of CSR published as part of the firm’s financial statements, in many ways. For one, it is the first 
mandatory disclosure by the SEC to address corporate human rights violations and appears to be 
a departure from its mandate to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets and 
facilitate capital formation.” However, the SEC maintains that this unique regulation, aimed at 
protecting human lives, is a way to “ensure capital allocative and operational efficiency” and serve 
as “an integrity injection mechanism within the capital market.”11 Secondly, Form SD disclosures 
may be precedential and serve as an example for similar legislation to regulate social criteria 
through US securities laws. Knowledge learned from the passage of the Act could also be extended 
to other conflicts or products, and even to human rights issues that do not involve conflict 
(Drimmer and Phillips, 2011). As such, the Act may have far-reaching implications that go well 
beyond conflict minerals and may signal a new role for the SEC in regulating social issues. Third, 
the information disclosed on Form SD appears to be more credible than that disclosed in CSR 
reports. In order to comply with the Act, SEC registrants that use conflict minerals in their 
manufactured products must conduct and report annually on their due diligence, and disclose this 
to the SEC. This process should lend credibility to the information disclosed. Additionally, Form 
SD disclosures need to be audited by external independent auditors, which make it less subject to 
management manipulations and should increase the credibility and public confidence in these 
disclosures. Form SD disclosures are also unique because they are standardized, and the SEC 
issues guidelines to companies on how to disclose conflict minerals information using Form SD 
                                                             
11 See http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
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(see Exhibit 1). Finally, Form SD disclosures are NOT part of the CSR report and the timing of its 
publication does not coincide with the publication of company’s financial statements and CSR 
reports. Information on Form SD should therefore be less noisy and less likely to be confounded 
by other information that is part of the financial statements or company’s CSR reports. Furthermore, 
since the release date of Form SD disclosures is different from the release date of the financial 
statements (10-K and 10-Q) and CSR report, it makes it possible to isolate the effect of human 
rights disclosures from the effect of other non-financial disclosures in the financial statements or 
CSR reports.  
These unique characteristics of Form SD disclosures provide the opportunity for this study to 
contribute to the empirical literature by exploring one single aspect of CSR - disclosures of 
corporate human rights performance. This study narrows the focus to the latter because of the 
shortcomings of CSR disclosures, which are mostly voluntary, unaudited and unstandardized 
(Milne and Gray, 2013). Thus, empirical studies that use a CSR measure based on annual reports 
typically suffer from methodological problems associated with endogeneity or because researchers 
are unable to isolate CSR disclosures from other information disclosed in financial statements 
(Richardson and Welker, 2001; Plumblee et al., 2008). Thus, one motivation for this study is to 
capitalize on the uniqueness of the mandatory conflict minerals disclosures that are less noisy, and 
potentially more informative than voluntary CSR disclosures. A second motivation is the current 
lack of empirical studies on, and hence a poor understanding of, the implications of human rights 
disclosures for shareholders.  
This leads to the first objective of this study, which is to examine the aggregate equity market 
response to regulatory intervention announcements leading to the passage of the Act on both users 
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and non-users of conflict minerals. We also examine the equity market response to conflict 
minerals special disclosures, in an attempt to determine their effectiveness and whether they 
provide material information to capital markets that will impact corporate human rights 
performance. Thus, this study helps to answer the question of whether or not investors price human 
rights risk into their investment decisions. We then examine the determinants of the equity market 
response for firms with different characteristics, including varying financial reporting costs, human 
rights concerns, and exploitation of excess rents from conflict minerals sources. Next, We explore 
early, voluntary disclosures related to corporate attitudes and perceived implications of the Act. 
Finally, we examine the unique characteristics of firms disclosing conflict minerals information in 
form SD. 
We find that disclosures under the Act are value relevant, in that investors react negatively to 
events that signal an increase in the likelihood of the conflict minerals legislation being made into 
law. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosures under the Act will 
force companies to reveal information detailing the extent of their exposure to human rights 
violations, thus providing information to investors about reputational, legal liability, operational, 
sanction and boycott risk. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that prior to the 
passage of the Act, investors were anticipating an increase in compliance cost, and a decline in 
excess profits. 
Next, the study provides information about firms’ concerns about the Act, by examining early 
disclosures of human rights concerns. The majority of the firms in the early disclosure sample 
express a negative attitude towards the Act. Most firms are concerned about the increase in 
compliance and production costs and reputation risk. 
8 
 
We find that conflict minerals mandatory disclosures in Form SD that informs investors about 
the extent of corporate exposure to human rights violation under the Act is associated with negative 
equity market reaction. The market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source 
their minerals from conflict zones, those with human rights violations, and those that fail to 
disclose the source of their minerals or whether the proceed from their minerals support or benefit 
armed groups engaged in human rights violations. Interestingly, there is some evidence that 
companies that source their minerals from non-conflict zones, obtain their minerals from recycled 
material or scrap and companies that do not support armed groups are associated with positive 
valuation effect. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure of 
corporate exposure to human right violation is associated with an increase in reputational, 
operational, legal liability, sanction and boycott risk and loss of excess rents. There is no evidence 
that voluntary human rights disclosures in the annual report and or in the CSR reports provide 
information to the market, likely because of the noise in such disclosures. 
Finally, relative to non-filer firms, there is evidence that companies filing the conflict minerals 
mandatory disclosures under the Act are characterized by poor human rights performance, lower 
levels of reputational capital, higher financial reporting costs, higher historical financial 
performance, lower transparency, larger size, and a greater likelihood of belonging to the Business 
Equipment industry.  
This paper provides preliminary evidence that Form SD is successful in reducing the 
governance gap that exposes investors to unnecessary sanction, litigation and reputation risk from 
firms’ conflict minerals usage. Given that human rights legislation represents unchartered territory 
for the SEC that is usually focussed on protecting investors and maintaining efficient capital 
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markets, this study provides evidence on the effectiveness of the format of the disclosure in the 
new legislation. That is, investors appear to react strongly to the stand-alone information produced 
by the flow-chart style, mandatory conflict minerals disclosure.  Taken together, the results from 
the cross sectional analysis of CARs provide an economic justification for companies with poor 
conflict minerals practices to improve, and avoid the high litigation and sanction costs that will 
arise if firm are forced to disclose human rights abuses. 
This paper makes several important contributions to the research on corporate social 
responsibility. First, it responds to the call to address the lack of empirical research in the area of 
human rights disclosures (Elizabeth, 2009). Next, it contributes to the literature by using 
information disclosed in Form SD, which is a stand-alone form released separately from financial 
statements and at a different date relative to the release date of the financial statements or the CSR 
reports, allowing for isolation of the equity market reaction to human rights disclosures from other 
firm information. Additionally, CSR is a broad area covering topics, such as environmental 
sustainability, legal liability and supply chain management, which may all have different 
implications for shareholder value. Another contribution of this paper is that it is the first empirical 
study that examines the value relevance of one aspect of CSR, human rights disclosures.  
This study also contributes to the debate on the usefulness of mandatory versus voluntary CSR 
disclosure. Prior to the Act, any disclosures of human rights issues were a part of voluntary CSR 
disclosures in annual or quarterly financial statements or stand-alone disclosures. The prior 
literature provides mixed views on the informativeness of these voluntary reports. On the one hand 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that stand-alone CSR reports reduce information asymmetry providing 
some evidence of a benefit of such disclosures. In contrast, Milne (2013), Milne and Gray (2013), 
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Moser and Martin (2012) argue that CSR disclosures lack reliability because they are self-serving, 
not audited and non-standard. One of the problems with these studies is that voluntary disclosure 
is an endogenous choice by firms. The mandatory disclosure examined in this study produces a 
different effect from voluntary disclosure because it is an exogenous shock that affects all firms 
(Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Dye, 1990; Zhang, 2001; Fishman and Hagerty, 2003). Compared to 
voluntary disclosure, the literature finds that mandatory regulations result in greater information 
externality, including comparability (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010; DeFond et al., 2011; Wang, 
2014). The strict reporting requirements of Form SD, which requires firms to use the same 
flowchart, depicted in Exhibit 1, provide information on the use and source of its conflict minerals, 
will increase comparability such that investors are able to better compare human rights risk. This 
paper is therefore able to establish causality relative to studies on voluntary disclosure (Plumblee 
et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Additionally, the equity market reaction is estimated around a 
short window of 3-5 days around the release of mandatory stand-alone reports, which reduces the 
effects of confounding events and increases the likelihood that the equity market reaction is caused 
by unanticipated information from the report.    
The scope of this study is far-reaching, because the successful implementation of the Act might 
set precedence for the SEC mandating other types of human rights disclosure beyond conflict 
minerals and the mining industry12 (ICAR, 2014). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the connection between the human 
rights and accounting.  Section three is potential contribution of the study.  Section four develops 
                                                             
12 There has been a call for mandated disclosures for the garment industry and mining in the oil sands (SEC, 2009) 
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testable hypotheses.  Section five presents the data and methods of analyses.  Section six contains 
the results.  Section seven concludes the paper.  
2. Human Rights and Accounting Disclosures 
Globalization has increased the size, power and influence of corporations, where large 
corporations, especially multinational corporations (MNC), have been able to undertake 
fundamental transformation in order to increase their market reach, share and profitability (Reed, 
2011; Sklair, 1995; Bakan, 2004; Korten, 2001; Monbiot, 2001). The power of MNCs has been 
linked to the size of their economic wealth (Currah, 2000), their capacity to shape the policy 
agendas of national states and international bodies (Korten, 2001), and their momentous impact 
(Marsden and Andriof, 1998). 
The increased power and reach of MNCs have been paralleled by an increase in the number of 
human rights violations and growing concerns over the impact of their business activities on  
human rights (Kinley, Nolan, & Zerial, 2007; Murphy, 2011). The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (2000) states that “global corporations may 
have a significant impact on human rights in their employment practices, in their environmental 
impact, and in their support for corrupt regimes or their advocacy for policy changes” (UNDP, 
2000 p. 79). Byrne (2014) indicates that the attempts to associate CSR with international 
enforcement of human rights continue to be hampered by the ability of the MNC to shift liability 
related to human rights violations from itself to national-states, as such, the sovereignty of the 
nation states is diminishing, and is being transferred to the MNC. Byrne (2014) calls for a regime 
of global human rights enforcement to be added to corporate adoption of CSR guidelines.  
12 
 
Preuss and Brown (2012) study the prevalence of corporate policies on human rights, which 
industry sectors are more active in designing human rights policies, and the content of such 
policies. They find a less than satisfactory engagement across all firms, as 42.8 percent of firms in 
their sample do not address human rights at all.  For those firms with some policies on human 
rights, the content of such policies is shallow and does not involve initiatives to protect and fulfil 
human rights.   
The increased number of corporate human rights violations raised concerns over corporate 
complicity in human rights abuses and instigated a business-related human rights debate (Amnesty 
International, 2005, 2006; Muchlinski, 2009; Ruggie, 2010; The United Nation, 2012) focused on 
addressing the tension between the corporate pursuits of shareholder wealth maximization, as 
instituted in corporate governance structures, and firms’ human rights performance (Cooper, 
Coulson, & Taylor, 2011; Sikka, 2011; Whelan, Moon, and Orlitzky, 2009). Furthermore, these 
concerns caused the United Nations to consider business human rights responsibilities and to 
explore ways for corporate actors to be accountable for the impact of their activities on human 
rights. The result of these efforts is the Ruggies’ (2008) “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework 
on human rights and business.  
On 16 June, 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights  for implementing Ruggie’s framework “… to provide for the first time an 
authoritative global standard for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse human rights 
impacts linked to business activity.” Ruggie’s (2008) framework rests on three core principles: the 
state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses, the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, and the need for more effective access to remedies 
13 
 
(p. 4). These Guiding Principles have far reaching implications for all businesses, both small and 
large, and represent one of the most significant developments in corporate governance this century 
(McPhail, Islam, and Huddle, 2014).  
Corporate commitment to social responsibility in general and to human rights in particular, is 
constrained by the existing corporate legal frameworks, which preclude corporations from 
voluntarily embracing social responsibility policies that might conflict with shareholder interests 
(Aras & Crowther, 2008; Lobel, 2006), and as corporate governance framework focuses on the 
rights of shareholders’ wealth maximization, other stakeholder rights including human rights have 
remained relegated to the areas of voluntary social policies (Horn, 2012). This has created a 
“governance gap”, which has been considered to be responsible for weakening corporate human 
rights performance (Bakan, 2004; Korten, 1998). The UN Human Rights Council Report by 
Ruggie (2008) has reported that the root cause of the business and human rights predicament today 
can be linked to the rise in corporate power and the governance gap created by globalisation (p. 
3). Ruggie (2008) states that “the root cause of the business and human rights predicament today 
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization”, which “provide the permissive environment 
for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to 
narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.” 
(Ruggie, 2008, p.3) 
In fact, the public has raised their concern on business and morality. Peter(1989) mentions 
shareholder groups have the tendency to exert pressure on companies to adopt higher ethical 
standards. From their viewpoint, highly competitive business domain does not mean that a 
company has reasons to be amoral. Instead, companies have to make profits together with adhering 
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to an ethical code of business operations. Soll (2014) in his book The Reckoning discusses the 
financial accountability and accounting standard from historical and political perspective by 
pointing out that firms have to make profit within the law framework. Consequently, the public 
call for mitigating the governance gap and arousing the awareness for companies to behave 
morally.  
As part of the debate about corporate human rights performance, disclosures of corporate 
exposure to human rights violation risk, emerges as one of the mechanisms to bridge the 
governance gap. Islam and McPhail (2011) attempt to explore corporate disclosure practices in 
relation to human rights and the way the language of human rights is beginning to enter corporate 
codes and reports. They discuss the development of global corporate disclosure on human rights 
and the adoption of the International Labour Organisation’s human rights standards by major 
multinational garment retail companies. They conclude that human rights disclosures have found 
their way into the voluntary disclosures made by multinational garment companies and this 
emergent discourse on corporate accountability for human rights deserves much more attention 
from the accounting community than it has received to date. Gallhofer, Haslam, and Walt (2011) 
explore the relationship between corporate responsibility, human rights and accountability and 
suggest that the CSR is an obvious place to explore the potential for accounting to serve human 
rights by disclosing information with regard to corporate activities and practices that violate human 
rights. Sikka (2011) explores the extent to which annual financial and corporate social 
responsibility reports could be mobilized to ensure greater corporate accountability for human 
rights. He observes that conventional accounting and corporate social responsibility reports seem 
to be unable to respond to the emerging agenda on human rights, however, he states that “A focus 
on human rights can reinvigorate accounting, corporate governance and CSR research and can 
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help to strengthen democracy, public accountability and provide a better world.”(Sikka 
2011,p.825) The debate about CSR disclosures in general and human rights disclosures in 
particular focuses on the materiality of such disclosures and whether voluntary or mandatory 
disclosure is the right prescription to tackle corporate human rights violations. Evidence supporting 
the value of voluntary disclosures are provided by Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang (2011) and 
Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012). They examine the benefits associated with the 
initiation of voluntary disclosures of CSR activities and conclude that initiating companies with 
superior CSR performance tend to enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital, and 
attract dedicated institutional investors and analysts. They also find lower absolute analyst forecast 
errors and dispersions following CSR disclosures.  
In contrast, several scholars argue against the value of voluntary disclosures. For example, 
Milne (1996, 2013), Milne and Gray (2013) note that sustainability reporting in the CSR reports 
and financial statements remains largely voluntary, non-standard, self-serving, and not 
independently verified or audited. Further there is no standardized terminology used that can be 
unambiguously interpreted. Thus, firms are free to choose what is reported, making comparisons 
across time and firms difficult. They conclude that corporate social and environmental reporting 
of business sustainability is “haphazard, bizarre, an assemblage of fantasy, or simply a delusional 
fantasy”. Moser and Martin (2012) indicate that most of the CSR disclosures are voluntary and 
mostly unverified by an independent third party, and managers may manipulate such disclosures. 
As such, the voluntary and unverified nature of CSR disclosures raises concerns regarding their 
reliability and completeness. Furthermore, they indicate that current CSR disclosures do not 
provide direct data on CSR expenditures or on the profitability of such expenditures. As such, it is 
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difficult to reliably determine whether CSR activities overall or even specific CSR expenditures 
increase or decrease firm profitability. 
Few studies discuss the value of mandatory CSR disclosures in general and human rights 
disclosures in particular. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) indicate that the current mandatory CSR 
reporting requirements are quite limited and do not appear to be strictly enforced. As such, any 
conclusions that are reached under the very limited mandatory CSR requirements that exist may 
be quite different from those reached under more complete mandatory CSR reporting 
requirements.  Bushee and Leuz (2005) examine the economic consequences of a regulatory 
change mandating companies listed on the OTC bulletin board to comply with the reporting 
requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The change increases mandated disclosures 
for firms previously not filing with the SEC. They report that mandatory disclosures result in 
significant costs for smaller firms. However, the SEC mandatory disclosures have significant 
benefits. Firms that previously file with the SEC experience positive equity returns and permanent 
increases in liquidity. This suggests positive externalities from regulatory mandated disclosures. 
For new compliant firms, they exhibit significant increases in liquidity which is consistent with 
improved disclosures reducing information asymmetry.  Bernaz (2013) proposes the adoption of 
extraterritorial measures by states to prevent and redress violations of human rights committed by 
companies outside their country of incorporation. Such measures may include the introduction of 
regulation to force companies to report on the social impacts of their operations and those of their 
subsidiaries abroad, or through direct exercise of extraterritorial jurisdictions. Bernaz (2013) 
suggests that such measures may have a positive impact on corporate human rights records and 
enhance corporate accountability.  
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This overview of the relationship between human rights and business can be concluded as 
follow: (1) globalization has increased the power and influence of corporation and this increase is 
accompanied by an increase in human rights violations mainly by MNCs, (2) the issue of whether 
or not MNCs engage in human rights violations is settled with ample of evidence pointing to 
corporate engagement in human rights violations. The main question is how to hold corporations 
accountable for the impact of their activities on human rights, (3) the root cause of the business 
and human rights predicament today is the governance gaps created by globalization which provide 
a permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies without adequate sanctioning or 
reparation, (4) the value  of voluntary CSR disclosures in general and human rights in particular 
are questionable because these disclosures are voluntary, unaudited, non-standard, noisy, self-
serving, and subject to management manipulation, (5) there is a scarcity of research in the 
accounting and finance community about corporate engagement in human rights violation and (6) 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical published research that has examined the 
impact of mandatory disclosures of corporate exposure to human rights violations. This study tries 
to file this gap in the CSR literature. 
3. Contributions of the Study 
     In this section, we discuss the unique contributions that this paper makes to the literature. 
Specifically, we discuss how the analysis of the regulatory timeline sample, and the early and 
mandated disclosure samples contribute to the literature. 
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3.1. Aggregate Equity market response to Regulatory Intervention Timeline 
The Act is an unprecedented piece of legislation and it is the first of securities regulation of 
social criteria13 directly aimed at human rights14. The Act seeks to eliminate funding to armed 
groups engaged in human rights abuses by requiring companies using conflict minerals to make 
special disclosures in their filings with the SEC.  These requirements are the first generation of 
socially responsible issues to be directly regulated by the SEC (Drimmer & Phillips, 2011) 
The fundamental theoretical premise of Section 1502 is based on the theoretical framework of 
“information forcing” rules which focuses on transparency and the devolution of information to 
interested parties, including citizens, regulators, and NGOs (Karkkainen, 2000). The idea is to 
move information from the entity best situated to hold or obtain information, the corporation, to 
the entity most likely to use it for the protection of public interests, civil society and regulators. 
(Ochoa & Keenan, 2011) 15 . Information-forcing, in the form of mandatory disclosures is 
associated with compliance costs and disclosures of certain risk information such as exposure to 
human rights violation risk, reputational risk, operation risk, legal liability risk, among others; as 
such, the Act can be viewed as a new mechanism to compel corporations to play a role in protecting 
human rights by means of raising the cost to companies of violating those rights.  
                                                             
13 The Dodd-Frank Act does not represent the first instance of securities regulation of social criteria. In early 2010, the SEC voted 
to issue interpretive guidance to companies on reporting the impact of climate change on their business (see John M. Broder, 
“S.E.C. Adds Climate Risk to Disclosure List,” The New York Times, January, 28, 2010, at B1.) 
14 Another provision of the Dodd-Frank Act notable of “social criteria” is Section 1504, which require certain disclosures of 
payments made to governments for the commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals. Given that human rights abuses 
often are committed by the governments of countries with hydrocarbon and/or minerals wealth, Section 1504 also bears indirectly 
on human rights. 
15 This approach suggests that firms “almost always know much more than the government about the risks associated with their 
products, technologies and processes” (Coglianese et al., 2004) 
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This unprecedented legislation and the SEC rulemaking that followed have inspired heated 
debate between those who view these efforts as a costly blunder and those who view them as a 
measured response to human-rights abuses committed by armed groups that control many of the 
mines in the DRC (Schwartz, 2015).  
Advocates of the legislation, including human rights advocates, socially responsible investment 
groups, and pension funds argue that: 1) the reason for using securities law such as the Act is the 
ineffectiveness of existing mechanisms for corporate accountability which are voluntary and lack 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, while securities laws, such as the Act, have more teeth 
and are tied to corporate laws (Sarfaty, 2013). Furthermore, existing voluntary disclosure does not 
provide sufficiently quantified and detailed information to determine company`s exposure to such 
risk. 2) The benefits of using the Act is that it raises the profile of human right related issues, 
establishes their link with company`s financial performance, and facilitates more efficient 
compliance. 3) Disclosures via Form SD will aid investor’s risk analysis and help strengthen 
markets, and due diligence is necessary to assess and mitigate companies human rights risk 
exposures. 4) The Act will protect investors by requiring a high level of disclosure throughout the 
company`s supply chain, thereby allowing investors to evaluate supply chain policies and practices, 
make company to company comparisons, and calculate the level of risk associated with conflict 
minerals sourcing (TAM, 2010), and 5) the mandatory disclosures under the Act will expose the 
potential reputational and financial risk of companies unknowingly sourcing conflict minerals, 
thereby funding the humanitarian crises in  the DRC, (Sarfaty, 2013). 
From the Opponents perspective, mainly companies and trade organization, the first and most 
important concern is the financial cost of compliance, which the SEC has estimated to be at least 
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$3-4 billion in initial compliance costs, and $200 to $400 million in ongoing compliance costs 
(SEC, 2012). A second concern is the absence of a definition for what supply chain due diligence 
entails, as well as the scope and substance of the auditing process. Finally, some companies fear 
that the legislation will damage their competitive position with foreign competitors and may 
impact their business relationships with the countries in which they operate. For example, private 
and foreign companies would not have to bear compliance costs; moreover, disclosure laws may 
place a company in breach of contract of host government laws, thus putting the company at a 
competitive disadvantage (API, 2012). Furthermore, corporations argue that the Act does not 
benefit investors, and they are concerned that the SEC is straying away from its mission and that 
any benefit to shareholders is outweighed by the considerable compliance costs borne by 
companies (Lynn, 2011). 
Given such a division among stakeholders, it is clear that the answer to the question of whether 
the Act provides material information is an empirical one. This leads to the first objective of this 
study, which is to examine the aggregate equity market response to regulatory intervention 
announcements leading to the passage of the Act on both users and non-users of conflict minerals. 
The results of the study will help to answer the question of whether the Act provides material 
information to investors, its effectiveness, and the effectiveness of the SEC in the new rule of 
legislating human rights disclosures. This is the first contribution of the study. 
3.2. Impact of Mandatory Disclosures in Form SD  
As mandated by the Act, if the company is deemed to be a user of conflict minerals, then it 
must file Form SD (special conflict minerals disclosure form) and conduct a reasonable country-
of-origin inquiry (RCOI) to determine if the minerals originated from the covered countries, track 
21 
 
and document the source and chain of custody; and include their findings in a public report called 
the Conflict Minerals Report (CMR). They must also include a description of the measures adopted 
to exercise due diligence on the conflict mineral’s source and chain of supply. As a part of firms’ 
due diligence process, the Act requires an independent private sector audit of firms’ Conflict 
Mineral Report. If, after reasonable inquiry, results show that the issuer‘s conflict minerals did not 
originate from any of the covered countries, the issuer is required to document the processes it 
undertook to arrive at this conclusion. In the event a firm determines the origin of its minerals to 
be one of the covered countries, the firm is required to submit a CMR. This requirement holds 
same for issuers that are unable to conclude that their conflict minerals did not originate from one 
of the covered Countries, that is they elect to exercise the “DRC conflict undeterminable” option. 
A company that manufactures products, or contracts for products to be manufactured, that are 
“DRC conflict undeterminable,” must disclose the steps taken to mitigate the risk that its necessary 
conflict minerals benefit armed groups. 
The disclosure requirements by the Act are special and uniquely different from other disclosures 
of CSR published as part firms’ financial statements, in several ways: 
 The Form SD disclosure may be precedential, in that it is the first mandatory disclosure 
by the SEC that deals with corporate human rights violations. As such it may provide an 
example for similar legislation and approaches to regulate social criteria through US 
securities laws. It also could be extended to other conflicts and other products and even to 
human rights impacts that do not involve conflict at all (Drimmer & Phillips (2011). This 
suggest that the Act may have larger significance and more far reaching implications that 
goes beyond conflict minerals for the following reasons: (1) Within the context of human 
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rights, the Act represents a meaningful step in the development of mechanisms to ensure 
that corporations respect human rights, and transform reporting on such activities from 
being voluntary to a mandatory legislative mandate that has behind it the enforcement 
power of the SEC, the most powerful regulatory body in the U.S. corporate context. (2) 
The Act is already part of a growing generation of U.S. securities laws regulating CSR 
issues, for example, Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires certain disclosures of 
payments made to governments for the commercial development of oil, natural gas or 
minerals. As such, the Act represents a legislative mandate for transparency, and (3) There 
is every reason to expect the SEC regulation of CSR to continue. The enactment of the Act 
represents a model that can be applied more broadly by advocates of CSR. The US 
Congress, having enacted the legislation, has a precedent at hand for similar issues, and as 
the SEC learns how to play a role in enforcing human rights norms, it will gain the 
institutional knowledge required to expand beyond the DRC conflict minerals context.  
 Form SD disclosures need to be audited by external independent auditors, which make 
them less subject to management manipulations and should increase the credibility and 
public confidence in such disclosures. 
 SD disclosures are standardized disclosures, and so the SEC issues guidelines to 
companies on how to disclose conflict minerals information via Form SD (see Exhibit 1). 
 Form SD disclosures are NOT part of the CSR report and the timing of their publications 
do not coincide with the publication of companies’ financial statements and CSR reports. 
This makes it less noisy and less likely to be confounded by other information that is part 
of the financial statements or company’s CSR report.  
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Several studies question whether any voluntary corporate reports disclosed in the CSR or in the 
financial statements, can address or capture true corporate social performance or the value of 
corporate social self-reporting itself.  Milne (2013, 1996) and Milne and Gray (2013) note that 
sustainability reporting in the CSR reports and financial statements remains largely voluntary, non-
standard, self-serving, and not independently verified or audited. Further there is no standardized 
terminology used that can be unambiguously interpreted. Thus, firms are free to choose what is 
reported, making comparisons across time and firms difficult. They conclude that corporate social 
and environmental reporting of business sustainability is haphazard, bizarre, an assemblage of 
fantasy, or simply a delusional fantasy.  
The unique characteristics of Form SD disclosures gives the opportunity to contribute to 
empirical literatures on CSR by exploring a new domain focused on the study of corporate 
disclosures and corporate human rights performance, and along this line, to examine the equity 
equity market response to conflict minerals special disclosures, which will help to determine their 
effectiveness and whether they provide material information to capital markets that will impact 
corporate human rights performance. This represent the second contribution of the study.  
3.3. The determinants of the Equity market response  
     The main thrust of conflict minerals regulation is to provide a mechanism to compel 
corporations to play a role in protecting human rights by means of raising the cost to companies 
that violate those rights. Forcing companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals is associated 
with compliance costs and disclosures of certain information revealing the extent of firm’s 
exposure to human rights violation risk, which incorporates a reputational risk (through naming 
and shaming), operational risk, legal liability risk, and sanction risk, among others. While the 
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equity market response to conflict minerals disclosures provide an aggregate assessment of the 
valuation effect and the market assessment of how investors perceive such disclosures, it is 
essential to determine whether the change in value is driven by 1) financial reporting and 
compliance costs concerns, 2) the revelation of new information about the extent of firms’ 
exposures to human rights violation risk, and 3) the expected loss of excess rents derived from 
sourcing “cheap minerals” mined under conditions of human right abuses, among other factors. 
This leads to the third contribution of the study, which is to examine the determinants of the equity 
market response to conflict minerals disclosures and attempts to differentiate between different 
hypotheses with regard to the impact of the Act. 
3.4. Early-Voluntary vs Mandatory Disclosures 
This study contributes to the debate about the informational value of voluntary versus 
mandatory conflict minerals disclosures. On the one hand, several prior studies provide evidence 
of benefits to voluntary disclosers through reduced cost of capital and lower information 
asymmetry (Dhaliwal, et al., 2011 and Dhaliwal et al., 2012). On the other hand, there is evidence 
that these general benefits might not extend to voluntary disclosures of conflict minerals 
information embedded within CSR reports. The information content of these early disclosures may 
be compromised due to their non-standard, unaudited nature (Milne, 1996 & 2013, Milne and Gray, 
2013). Given that there is no standardized reporting format, or independent verification of the 
information, managers may use these reports in a self-serving manner such that the quality of the 
information may be poor (Moser and Martin, 2012). Besides the potentially poor quality of the 
information discussed above, it is hard to isolate the equity market reaction that is specific to 
conflict minerals because it is disclosed with unrelated news about other CSR activities.  
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Given these conflicting views about the quality of early conflict minerals, and to provide 
evidence on the informational value of the two types of disclosures, we examine the equity market 
reaction to voluntarily disclosed conflict minerals information of 542 firms as a part of their CSR 
reports in annual (10-K) or quarterly (10-Q) financial reports before May, 31, 2014, the deadline 
for the submission the mandatory Form SD to the SEC. Many of these firms used this disclosure 
forum to express their opinions about the implications of the forthcoming bill. Using the same 
methodology, we are able to compare the equity market reaction of such early disclosures to the 
equity market reaction of the mandatory disclosure in Form SD to provide evidence on the relative 
informativeness of the two types of disclosures. This approach provides information about the 
format of presenting CSR disclosures.    
4. Testable Hypotheses 
     In this section we develop testable hypotheses regarding (1) the aggregate equity market 
reaction to regulatory events leading to the passage of the Conflict Minerals Act. (2) the equity 
market reaction to mandatory disclosures regarding conflict minerals using the mandated Form 
SD specialized report, and (3) the equity market reaction to early voluntary disclosures of conflict 
minerals use. We also examine the equity market reaction conditional on specific risk factors. 
4.1 Regulatory Intervention Timeline of the Conflict Minerals Act 
Since the initial introduction of the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 by Senator Sam 
Brownback there have been several events relevant to the final passage of the Act in 2010. 
Appendix A provides a timeline and details of each of these events. Each event provides 
incremental information to investors about the likelihood of success or failure of the bill, which in 
turn has different implications for firms depending on the extent of their exposure to conflict 
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minerals. We therefore focus on the aggregate equity market response to all of these events in 
assessing whether the market views the bill as enhancing or destroying shareholder value. We 
isolate those events that were relevant to the Conflict Minerals Act, and so were not confounded 
by unrelated disclosures. We predict that investors anticipate that compliance with the bill will 
increase firms’ cost of compliance or force companies to reveal information that may increase 
legal liability, reputation risk, operation, and sanction and boycott risk, and we expect a negative 
aggregate equity market reaction to relevant events leading up to the passage of the Act. 
Furthermore, we predict that the strength of the equity market reaction is dependent on the 
importance of conflict minerals to firms’ operations. We expect a more negative aggregate equity 
market response for companies which rely heavily on conflict minerals because of the greater risks 
and costs associated with compliance.  
H1: There will be a negative equity market reaction to regulatory announcements/events that 
signal the likelihood of the passage of the Conflict Minerals Act, which will be more negative for 
heavy users of conflict minerals.  
4.2. Special Disclosures of Conflict Minerals Information in Form SD 
The Act dictates that, irrespective of their fiscal year end, all affected companies have to file 
Form SD, the Specialized Disclosure Report, for the first time by May 31, 2014 for the calendar 
year 2013, and by May 31 of each year thereafter. The SEC outlines a three-step process that firms 
have to follow in order to comply with the rule. First, firms must determine if the rule applies to 
them. Affected companies are all U.S. publicly traded companies, or foreign owned companies 
that report to the SEC and who use conflict minerals because it is “necessary to the functionality 
or production of a product” the company manufactures or contracts to manufacture.  Next, firms 
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must conduct a reasonable country of origin inquiry (RCOI) and file Form SD with the SEC, 
Finally they must complete, audit, and attach a CMR to Form SD, if it is required. Firms are exempt 
from completing a CMR only if conflict minerals were used prior to January 31, 2013, if conflict 
minerals are used only from recycled or scrap sources, or if the firm contracts to manufacture a 
product but has no input or influence over its design or composition. The CMR must include a due 
diligence section, that describes the steps the firm took or is taking to exercise due diligence on 
the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals, and steps taken or to be taken to mitigate the 
risk that armed groups benefit from its conflict minerals. See Exhibits 2 and Exhibit 3 for an 
example of a completed Form SD and CMR report for Intel Corporation and Veeco Instruments 
Inc.   
The standardized format of the mandated disclosure significantly increases the transparency 
about the use of conflict minerals and the origin and circumstances surrounding the supply chain 
of these minerals.  As a form of mandatory disclosure of human rights performance the disclosures 
required by the Act serve to level the playing field between firms that use the cheaper conflict 
minerals and firms that pay a premium to use certified sources. As such, the new regulation is a 
disciplining mechanism that limits the excess rents that firms can obtain at the expense of human 
rights, so that they are forced to consider alternative certified sources or to take action to certify 
the existing ones. Since all companies that use conflict minerals must file Form SD, but not 
necessarily the CMR report, the new rule as implemented has the potential to provide new 
information to investors on the risks associated with conflict minerals use. We hypothesize that 
mandatory disclosure of corporate exposure to human right violation is associated with an increase 
in reputation, operational, legal liability, sanction and boycott risk and loss of excess rents 
generated from sourcing “cheap minerals” mined under conditions of human rights abuses. We 
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predict a negative equity market reaction to the release of Form SD reports that indicate that firms 
use conflict minerals in their operations. 
H2a: Conflict minerals mandatory disclosures informing investors about the extent of 
corporate exposure to human rights violation under the Act will be associated with a negative 
equity market reaction. 
If Form SD discloses that a firm obtains minerals only from certified sources, investors will 
assess that the firm acts ethically and expect no costly audit procedures or increased investment 
risk. However, firms that disclose that they use minerals from the covered zone will incur 
additional costs to conduct supply chain due diligence and to comply with the Act. They will also 
lose any price advantage from the cheaper minerals and be subject to legal liability, and sanction, 
operational and reputational risk. Similarly, if Form SD and the included CMR report reveal 
information that a firm supports armed groups, investors will likely assess higher audit and 
compliance fees, and higher human rights violations risk. The equity market will price these 
additional risks such that the equity market reaction will be negative for firms that source minerals 
from the conflict zone or support armed groups. 
The SEC has allowed a grace period until 2016 during which firms can indicate “DRC conflict 
undeterminable” as the source of their conflict minerals, which constitutes non-disclosure. 
However, because the prior research argues that investors cannot distinguish between bad news 
and non-disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983; Skinner, 1994), we anticipate that investors will assess 
increased audit costs and legal liability for non-disclosers and predict a negative equity market 
reaction for firms that elect to use the “DRC Conflict undeterminable” option.  
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H2b: The equity market reaction to the disclosure of Form SD will be more negative for firms 
that source minerals from the covered zone, firms that support armed groups, and firms that file 
as “DRC Conflict undeterminable”. 
4.3. Cross-Sectional Regression 
While the overall equity market reaction to disclosures in Form SD and CMR report is expected 
to be negative, it is not known what specific risk factors drive investor response. In this section we 
address some of the concerns raised by firms about the Act by performing cross sectional analyses 
to differentiate between the human rights concerns and the financial reporting costs arguments, 
and to determine whether the equity market response is influenced by increased risk (legal liability, 
reputational, sanction and boycott risk), firm performance, information asymmetry and industry 
and size effects.  
If the disclosures provide information to help investors assess the potential effects of the 
conflict minerals rule, we expect a negative equity market reaction to mandatory disclosure by 
firms for whom implementation of the act is most costly: i.e. firms with human right concerns, 
firms sourcing minerals from conflict zones, firms, where the proceeds from conflict minerals 
support armed groups, facing higher sanction risks, firms with high audit costs, firms whose 
profitability and financial reporting quality is dependent on obtaining the cheaper conflict 
minerals, firms with greater information asymmetry and firms more likely to use conflict minerals 
because of their industry. 
4.3.1. Human Rights Violation Risk.  
To proxy for human rights violation risk, we utilize the following five variables: 
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a. Human Rights Performance (HRCON): KLD's Global Sustainability Index is a socially 
responsible investing and sustainability index that reflects the degree to which a company 
addresses current social and environmental needs without sacrificing the quality of life of future 
generations. Corporations that score high on the KLD index are strong stewards of the 
environment, advocates of local and global communities, and promoters of high labor standards 
for their employees and those in their supply chain, and producers of high quality and safe 
products. These firms behave ethically in their business endeavors. Many of the dimensions along 
which firms are evaluated for the KLD score are voluntary actions and/or disclosure of corporate 
social responsibility activities. For example, the human rights sub-category assigns high scores for 
firms that establish relations with indigenous peoples and who demonstrate transparency in their 
disclosures of human rights issues. Adhering to these ethical behavioral practices will preclude a 
firm from sourcing minerals from the covered zone and supporting or contributing to human rights 
abuses, given that there are ample sources of minerals in non-covered zones (AIA, 2014). 
Appendix B, for example, reports the Conflict Minerals worldwide production, and shows the 
DRC production relative to the worldwide production, the total revenue generated from DRC 
minerals in millions of US dollars and the amount which fund DRC conflict. Not only is the DRC 
not a top producer of conflict minerals, but more than half of its revenue from those sources fund 
armed groups. 
We predict that firms with poor human rights performance in the past, as reflected in the 
number of human rights concerns (HRCON), will be more likely to have a negative equity market 
reaction to disclosure of Form SD.  
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b. Reputational Capital (REPUT): The Fortune Magazine’s List of Most Admired Companies is 
based on the results of a survey of industry executives, directors, and securities analysts. Firms 
with high corporate reputations, such as those named to the Fortune list enjoy increased corporate 
worth and the reputational capital view predicts that a positive reputation will result in long-term 
competitive advantages for firms (Klewes and Wreschniok, 2010). Firms that have invested time 
and resources into cultivating a high reputational capital will be less likely to risk this reputation 
by engaging in activities that violate human rights concerns. This is especially true for highly 
visible issues such as conflict minerals, which has emerged as a new hot-button topic for many 
industry and international groups leading efforts to address the issue of funding violence in the 
DRC16. We predict that firms with high reputational capital will have a less negative equity market 
reaction to disclosure of Form SD. 
c. Sanction and Boycott Risk (SANCTION): The states of California, Maryland and Florida have 
implemented a policy against offering government contracts to firms with interest in the conflict 
zone. These strict sanctions (not to grant government contracts to companies who source  its 
minerals from conflict zones)  against human rights violations should result in more negative 
equity market reaction for firms incorporated in these states filing Form SD.  
d. Conflict Zones (CZONE): Companies that disclose in their CMR that they source their minerals 
from conflict zones are associated with higher exposure to human rights violation risk and thus 
more negative equity market reactions. CZONE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company 
                                                             
16 For example, Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) developed the 
Conflict Free Smelter Program, which helps compliance efforts by listing compliant smelters and Solutions for Hope, created by 
Motorola, is a pilot initiative to source conflict-free tantalum from the DRC. Nokia, RIM, Intel, Motorola and HP are some of the 
companies that signed on to participate. 
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disclose in its Form SD that it sources minerals from the conflict zone and zero otherwise. Thus, a 
negative relationship is anticipated between CZONE and the announcement period CAAR. 
e. Armed Groups (ARMGRP): Companies disclosing that the proceeds from conflict minerals 
support armed groups that engage in human rights violations will be exposed to a higher degree of 
human rights violation risk, and hence, a more negative valuation  on the announcement date. No 
companies in the sample disclose that the proceeds from their conflict minerals support armed 
groups, however, they disclose that after RCOI they find that either 1) the proceeds do not support 
armed groups or 2) they are not able to determine whether or not the proceeds support armed 
groups, that is they choose “DRC Conflict Undeterminable”. ARMGRP is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the company discloses in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do 
not support armed groups. Companies that disclosed in Form SD that their conflict minerals do 
not support armed groups are more likely to have less exposure to human rights violations risk, as 
such, will be associated with a positive (less negative) equity market response. We anticipate a 
positive relation between ARMGRP and CAAR.  
In summary, we predict a negative equity market reaction for firms that obtain minerals from the 
covered zone or support armed groups, for firms with a history of human rights violations, as 
reflected in low KLD indices, and for firms incorporated in states which sanctions companies 
which source their minerals from conflict zones, since the market will assess higher likelihood of 
involvement in conflict minerals, and hence higher investment risk for these firms. Conversely, 
firms with higher reputational capital, such as firms on Fortune’s list of most admired companies 
will be less impacted by the new regulation since the market will assess little change to their 
investment risk. 
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H3a: There is a negative equity market reaction for firms that obtain minerals from the covered 
zone or support armed groups, for firms with a history of human rights violations, as reflected in 
low KLD indices, and for firms incorporated in states which sanctions companies which source 
their minerals from conflict zones, and a positive (less negative) reaction for firms with higher 
reputational capital. 
4.3.2. Financial Reporting Costs, Financial Performance and Financial Reporting Quality 
a. Financial Reporting Costs (TAFEES): Firms that use conflict minerals are required to conduct 
a reasonable country of origin inquiry to determine whether any of the conflict minerals originated 
in the DRC or an adjoining country, or are from recycled or scrap sources. Depending on the 
determination from this inquiry, a company may be further required to conduct extensive supply 
chain due diligence in accordance with the SEC’s rules. Furthermore, companies have to undertake 
audit and certification requirements, which include obtaining an independent private sector audit 
for its CMR, including the audit report as a part of the CMR and identifying the auditor. Firms 
with already high financial reporting costs will incur even greater costs to comply with the new 
Act. We use total audit fees as a proxy for financial reporting cost, and predict that firms with 
higher financial reporting costs will be more likely to have a more negative equity market response 
to disclosure of CMR.     
b. Financial Performance (FPSCORE) and Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ): Companies with 
superior financial performance are less likely to be impacted by the additional costs of compliance 
and more capable to weather additional risks associated with conflict minerals disclosures. We use 
a factor score from several financial performance indicators and predict that firms with higher 
financial performance score to be associated with less negative (more positive) equity market 
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response to CMR disclosures. Similarly, firms with high financial performance will have less need 
to use accounting accruals to cover up poor performance. The proxy used for FRQ is a measure 
that assesses the quality and degree of accrual-based earnings management. It is calculated using 
the Jones (1991) Model as modified by Kothari et al. (2005).  Higher estimated values from the 
adjusted Jones Model (AJONES) indicate lower FRQ. We predict a positive equity market response 
to CMR disclosure and financial reporting quality. 
H3b: The equity market reaction to the disclosure of Form SD will be more negative for companies 
with higher financial reporting cost as evident by higher audit fees and more positive (less 
negative) for firms with higher financial performance and financial reporting quality. 
4.3.3. Information Asymmetry (SPREAD) 
     Firms that use conflict free minerals can more easily disclose information about where they 
source raw materials. Their disclosure requirements are also much lower than firms using conflict 
minerals that must conduct extensive supply chain due diligence in accordance with the SEC’s 
rules. Less transparent companies are less likely to voluntarily disclose information about their 
engagement in human rights violations. However, mandatory disclosures on Form SD will force 
less transparent companies to reveal more information about the extent of their exposure to human 
rights violations. We predict that firms with lower transparency and hence high degrees of 
information asymmetry as reflected in high bid-ask spreads, will have a more negative equity 
market response to the release of the mandatory report. Thus, the equity market reaction to the 
disclosure of Form SD will be more negative for firms with high information asymmetry and a 
negative relation is anticipated between SPREAD and the CAAR. 
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4.3.4. Control Variables 
     Firms in the technological industries are more likely to use conflict minerals and hence file 
Form SD. We predict that firms in industry groups 6 and 7 based on the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification will be more likely to file Form SD and indicate that they source minerals from the 
conflict zone and they are expected to have a more negative equity market reaction to the disclosure 
of the CMR reports, hence, a negative relation is anticipated between INDUST and the CAAR.  
     Similar to firms with higher financial performance, larger firms are better able to weather the 
higher costs of compliance with the Act. Larger firms have the advantage of economies of scale in 
terms of financial reporting costs. We predict that larger firms will be more likely to have a less 
negative equity market reaction to disclosure of the CMR because they bear relatively lower risks 
and compliance costs. As such, we anticipate a positive relation between SIZE and CAAR.  
4.4. Early Disclosures of Conflict Minerals Information  
While compliance with the Act became mandatory only after 2014, some firms voluntarily 
disclosed information regarding conflict minerals use as a part of their CSR reports in annual (10-
K) or quarterly (10-Q) financial reports. Many of these firms used this disclosure forum to express 
their opinions about the implications of the forthcoming bill. For example, some firms indicted 
that the Act would increase their exposure to legal liability, reputational or operational risk, or that 
compliance and production costs would increase. Other firms expressed concerns over supply 
limitations, increase in prices and reduced profitability or the difficulty in verifying conflict 
minerals sources and supply chains. If the disclosures provide information to help investors assess 
the potential effects of the Act, we would expect a negative equity market reaction to voluntary 
disclosure by firms that express a negative opinion of the Act or that indicate that its passage would 
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increase costs, risk, legal liability or decrease profitability. However, the direction of the equity 
market reaction to the voluntary disclosure of conflict minerals use in CSR reports is unclear. On 
the one hand, the prior literature provides evidence of benefits to voluntary disclosers through 
reduced cost of capital and lower information asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) and Dhaliwal et 
al., 2012). On the other hand, there is evidence that these general benefits might not extend to 
voluntary disclosures of conflict minerals information embedded within CSR reports. The 
information content of these early disclosures may be compromised due to their non-standard, 
unaudited nature (Milne, 1996 & 2013, Milne and Gray, 2013). Given that there is no standardized 
reporting format, or independent verification of the information, managers may use these reports 
in a self-serving manner such that the quality of the information may be poor (Moser and Martin, 
2012). Besides the potentially poor quality of the information discussed above, it is hard to isolate 
the equity market reaction that is specific to conflict minerals because it is disclosed with unrelated 
news about other CSR activities. Given the conflicting views about the quality of early conflict 
minerals disclosures and the confounding information at the time of its release, we do not make a 
formal prediction on the equity market reaction to these early disclosures.  
H4: The equity market reaction to early disclosures of conflict minerals information released 
in CSR reports could be positive or negative. 
5. Data and Method of Analysis 
The data of this study consists of three samples: (1) the regulatory intervention timeline sample, 
(2) the special disclosures of conflict minerals in Form SD sample, and (3) the early disclosure 
sample. To estimate the equity market response to conflict minerals information disclosure the 
study apply the Fama and French (1997) three-factor model as the abnormal returns generating 
37 
 
process. Furthermore, to examine the determinants of the equity market response and to 
differentiate between different hypotheses we estimate a cross-section regression model where the 
three-day announcement period CAAR is the dependent variable, model specification and the 
expected direction of each independent variable are depicted in Table 7. To examine the main 
characteristics of disclosing firm relative to non-disclosing, we estimate a logistic regression model 
which is depicted in Table 9. A detail explanation and definition of the variables utilized in this 
study, the source of each variable, and the time period involved is provided in Appendix C. The 
following is a detailed explanation of the three samples, estimate of the announcement period 
CAAR, the cross-sectional, and the logistic regression models.  
5.1. Regulatory Intervention Timeline Sample  
An early version of the Act was originally proposed in May 22, 2008 by Senators Samuel 
Brownback and Richard Durbin to the Senate Finance Committee as a bill called “The Conflict 
Coltan and Cassiterite ACT of 2008”  which become part (Section 1502) of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July 21, 2010.  The final rule was adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 22, 2012 which requires companies to 
publicly disclose their use of conflict minerals that originated in the DRC and adjoining countries. 
Although the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (including Section 1502) involved a process with 
considerable discussion, we focus on 16 specific events between 2008 and 2012 that we assess to 
represent the regulatory events which led to the conflict minerals mandate. 
We identified the events by searching the Dow Jones News Retrieval and search engines such 
as Google and Yahoo, among others, using the terms “Conflict Minerals”, “Minerals in Conflict 
Zones”, and “Dodd-Frank Section 1502”.  We identified the events that had the greatest effect on 
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the likelihood of the Conflict minerals rule adoption. Events that simply confirmed an earlier event 
were eliminated. Furthermore, for each event, we searched the Wall Street Journal and other search 
engines for any confounding major events over the three-day window, from day t-1 through day t+1 
relative to the event day t0. Appendix A provides a list of these events, and its content followed by 
any confounding news associated with each event if any.      
To examine the equity market response around the conflict minerals regulatory events timeline, 
we construct a sample of firms which includes all publicly traded US-listed companies with returns 
data on the CRSP (Center for Research on Security Prices) database and financial statement 
information  on the COMPUSTAT database over the period January 1, 2007 through July 1, 2014. 
These criteria produced a sample of 5,855 firm-year observations. We deleted financial institutions 
(1,438 firms) and firms with missing returns (777 firms) to obtain a final sample of 3,640 firms.  
Based on industry classification, product line description, and a map provided by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), we placed each firm into one of three categories, 
based on their utilization of conflict minerals: Heavy users (1,505), Medium users (454), and No 
users (1,681).     
We estimate the equity market reaction for the total sample and for each group, as the abnormal 
stock return around each of the 16 events using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model as the 
return-generating process. This model simultaneously controls for firm size and the differential-
risk factor between firms with high, versus low, market-to-book ratios. The average abnormal 
return (AAR) is calculated using an OLS regression using 150 daily returns from trading day t = -
210 through trading day t = -61, relative to the press release date. The AAR for event date t is 
calculated as a simple cross-sectional average over the number of firms in the sample (N). The 
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event window is the three-day period (t-1 to t+1) cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and 
it is expected to capture the equity market reaction associated with the conflict minerals regulatory 
timeline. Both the rank z-test (RTEST), as developed by Corrado (1989), and the jackknife z-test 
(JNTEST) developed by Giaccotto and Sfiridis (1996) are utilized to test for the level of 
significance of the AARs and the CAARs. 
5.2. Special Disclosures of Conflict Minerals (Form SD) Sample 
Under Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, SEC registrants, including domestic, foreign, and 
smaller reporting companies, are required to file Form SD under Rule 13p-1, if applicable, 
beginning May 31, 2014 (for the 2013 calendar year) and annually on May 31 every year thereafter. 
Form SD will disclose the filer’s use of conflict minerals originating from the DRC or an adjoining 
country provided the conflict minerals are “necessary to the functionality or production” of a 
product manufactured or contracted to be manufactured by the filer. Furthermore, companies are 
required to publicly disclose information each calendar year on the source of tantalum, tin, gold, 
and tungsten, and the chain of custody.  
Among the requirements on Form SD: (1) Firms must provide a description of the measures 
taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals. (2) Firms 
must file a statement that the company has obtained an independent private sector audit of the 
CMR. (3) A company that manufactures products, or contracts for products to be manufactured, 
that are “DRC conflict undeterminable,” must disclose the steps taken to mitigate the risk that its 
conflict minerals benefitted armed groups. (4) A company must use a nationally or internationally 
recognized due diligence framework in determining the source and chain of custody of conflict 
minerals. (5) During the first two calendar years following November 13, 2012 for all companies, 
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and the first four calendar years for smaller companies, firms will not be required to submit an 
audit report of its CMR for any products that are “DRC conflict undeterminable.” Subsequently, 
undeterminable minerals must be described as not conflict-free. The new Form SD, as it pertains 
to conflict minerals, must be filed on the SEC's EDGAR online database, no later than May 31 
after the end of the issuer's most recent calendar year. Exhibits 2 and 3 provide a modified Form 
SD for Intel Corporation and for Veeco Instruments Inc. respectively.  
We searched the SEC filings for the conflict minerals Special Disclosure Form (Form SD) for 
the final sample of 3,639 firms over the period from January 1, 2014 through September 30, 2014 
(the start date of data analysis). The first Form SD and CMR was filed by Siliconware Precision 
Industries Co. Ltd. on April 24, 2014, whose CMR was filed as an exhibit to the Form SD.  The 
search produces 1,154 companies with Form SD filings. We downloaded and read Form SD for 
each of the 1,154 companies. The search led to the following findings with regard to the covered 
zone: (a) 191 companies disclosed that their minerals are sourced from conflict zones. (b) 270 
companies disclosed that their minerals are sourced from non-conflict zones or obtained from 
recycled or scrap materials. (c) 677 companies disclosed that they are not able to determine the 
source of their conflict minerals (Undetermined). (d) 16 companies do not provide information 
about the source of their minerals. 
Furthermore, we searched Form SD to ascertain whether the proceeds from the conflict 
minerals supported armed groups. We found that (a) 70 companies disclosed that the proceeds do 
not support armed groups; (b) No company disclosed that the proceeds support armed groups; (c) 
795 companies indicated that they were not able to determine if the proceed supported armed 
groups; (d) For 260 companies, the issue was not applicable since they do not source minerals 
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from conflict zones; (e) 20 companies provided no information in the Form SD. Table 1 provides 
a summary statistics of the total sample, the early disclosure sample, and the Form SD disclosure 
sample. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
5.3. Cross-sectional analysis 
     To examine the determinants of the equity market reaction to corporate disclosures of human 
rights violation risk and to differentiate between the different hypotheses explained earlier, we 
employ the following cross-sectional regression using CAAR. We assume that the announcement 
period CAARs associated with Form SD disclosures will reflect the valuation effect due to a firm’s 
exposure to human rights violation risk reflected in the company’s mandatory CMR.  We proxy 
for firm’s human rights performance, financial reporting costs, financial performance, and 
financial reporting quality. 
CAAR = β0 + β1 CZONE + β2 HRCON + β3 ARMGRP + β4 SANCTION + β5 REPUT + β6 TAFEES 
+ β7 FRQ + β8 FPSCORE + β9 SIZE + β10 SPREAD + β11 INDUST + ε;  
Where: CAAR = the three-day period (t-1 to t+1) cumulative average abnormal return around the 
disclosure date of Form SD.  
CZONE = Proxy for human rights violation risk defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company discloses that its minerals are sourced from the conflict zone and zero otherwise.  
HRCON= Historical human rights performance measured as the number of concerns minus the 
number of strengths from the human right section of KLD. 
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ARMGRP = Proxy for human rights violation risk, defined as a dummy variable equal 1 if the 
company disclosed in its Form SD that its conflict minerals proceeds do not support armed groups 
in the conflict zone and zero otherwise. 
SANCTION  = Proxy for sanction risk, defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s 
headquarter is located in the states of California or Maryland, or in St. Petersburg-Florida, and 
zero otherwise. 
REPUT= proxy for corporate reputational risk, measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is on the list of Fortune’s most admired companies, and zero otherwise.  
TAFEES = total audit fees divided by total assets, a proxy for financial reporting costs. 
FRQ = the measure of firm’s financial reporting quality, calculated using the Jones (1991) Model 
as modified by Kothari et al. (2005). 
FPSCORE = factor score measuring firm financial performance, summarizing 13 measures of 
book value and market value based measures;  
SIZE = log of firm total assets;  
SPREAD = degree of information asymmetry measured by firms’ bid-ask spread;  
INDUST = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to the Business Equipment 
(computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and 
televisions) industry, based on Fama-French 12-industry classification scheme. 
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5.4. Logistic Regression Analysis 
     We utilize the following logistic regression to examine the characteristics of reporting 
companies who file Form SD relative to non-reporting companies, since one objective of this paper 
is to determine the unique characteristics or factors associated with firms disclosing conflict 
minerals information in their Form SD. The logistic regression model is given by:  
LOGIT= β0 + β1 HRCON + β2 SANCTION + β3 REPUT + β4 TAFEES + β5 FPSCORE 
           + β6 FRQ + β7 SPREAD + β8 SIZE + β9 INDUST + ε; 
Where LOGIT is an indicator variable that equals one for companies that filed Form SD and zero 
for non-filers.  
5.4.1. Financial Performance (FP) 
     Peloza (2009) criticizes previous researchers for employing a single measure of financial 
performance. In some cases, he argues, these proxies are market-based, while others are 
accounting-based. In this paper we address this problem by utilizing factor analysis to capture 
information from several accounting-based and market-based measures often used to represent 
financial performance in previous studies. The proxy for financial performance is the summary 
factor score (FPSCORE), which is derived from the following 13 variables using data from the 
Annual and Quarterly North American COMPUSTAT database: 
1. ROA: return on assets defined as quarterly net income (COMPUSTAT #45 (NIQ)),divided by 
average assets over the quarter (COMPUSTAT #44 (ATQ)). 
44 
 
2. ROE: return on equity defined as quarterly net income divided by average shareholder’s equity. 
Shareholder’s equity is defined as the total liabilities plus shareholder’s equity (COMPUSTAT #44 ) 
minus total liabilities (#54 (LTQ)). 
3. ROS: return on sales defined as quarterly net income (NIQ) divided by net sales  (COMPSUSTAT 
#2 (SALEQ). 
4. EVA: economic value added define as earnings before interest and taxes divided by the average 
of total assets. EBIT= operating income after depreciation (COMPUSTAT #21 (OIADPQ) ) + non-
operating income (expense) (COMPUSTAT #31 (NOPIQ)). 
5. EVADA: economic value added after depreciation and amortization defined as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by average total assets. 
EBITDA=OIBDPQ+NOIQ; OIBDPQ: operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT #21). 
6. EPS: earnings per share (basic), including extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT #11).  
7. QUAEARN: a measure of earnings quality defined as the net cash flow from operating activities 
(COMPSTAT #108 OANCFY) divided by net income. 
8. TOBQ:  Tobin’s Q ratio defined as (Market value + PSTKQ + DLCQ +DLTTQ)/ total assets. 
Market value = common shares outstanding (COMPUSTAT #61) * (COMPUSTAT #14), PSTKQ 
is total preferred capital stock (#55), DLCQ is the total debt in current liabilities (#45), and DLTTQ 
is total long-term debt (#51).  
9. MVA: market value added defined as (Market value – Book value of common equity - DLCQ – 
DLTTQ). Book value of common equity is the COMPUSTAT #59. 
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10. EPSG: earnings growth in EPS over the previous quarter. 
11. SALEG: sales growth over the previous quarter. 
12. RET: quarterly rate of return, defined as the sum of monthly stock returns over the quarter. 
13. ABRD: abnormal rate of return calculated as follows: First, the differences between monthly 
stock returns (ret) and value-weighted market returns (VWRETD) for each month of the quarter 
are obtained. Second, we sum the monthly differences from the first step for the quarter. Then, the 
sum from the second step is divided by the standard deviation of the monthly returns over the 
quarter. 
     To obtain a comprehensive, broad-based measure for financial performance, we perform a 
factor analysis to summarize the information in the 13 financial performance measures. 
5.4.2. Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) 
The two most widely-used proxies for FRQ in the literature are total accrual quality, based on 
the modified Jones model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005) and the modified Dechow and 
Dichev (DD) model (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Because the DD model requires cash flow 
information from the following accounting period, use of this model significantly reduces the 
number of observations. Therefore, we have chosen to use the modified Jones model as the proxy 
for FRQ.  To test the robustness of the findings, we repeat the analysis using the modified DD 
model.  
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The proxy used for FRQ is a measure that assesses the quality and degree of accrual-based 
earnings management. It is calculated using the Jones (1991) Model as modified by Kothari et al. 
(2005).  Higher estimated values from the adjusted Jones Model (AJONES) indicate lower FRQ.  
5.5. Early disclosure sample  
     Using the SEC’s Edgar system (www.sec.gov) we searched the 10-K, the 10-Q, and the 
corporate social responsibility reports (CSR) for each firm in final sample of 3,639 firms for early 
disclosures related to the corporate response to the conflict minerals legislation. We conducted the 
search over the period from June 30, 2010 (the date when the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Act, including Section 1502) through May 31, 2014 (the first implementation date). The search 
produced a sample of 455 firms that disclosed information about their attitude towards, and/or 
their concerns about the expected impact of the Act on their company. The distribution of these 
attitudes/concerns can be classified into the following 11 categories: 
1) Negative Attitude toward Conflict Minerals Legislation:  These companies express a negative 
attitude towards the upcoming mandatory Conflict Mineral Disclosure. Such information is 
disclosed in their annual/quarterly report (e.g. 10-K/Q, 20-F) prior to the mandatory due date of 
June 2, 2014. For example, Johnson Outdoors Inc. states in their 2013 10-K annual report 
that:“…Among other things, the implementation of this rule could adversely affect the sourcing, 
availability and pricing of such materials if they are found to be used in the manufacture of the 
Company’s products, and this in turn could affect the costs associated with the Company’s 
products” 
2) Neutral Attitude toward Conflict Minerals Legislation: These companies disclose information 
about conflict minerals without expressing either a positive or negative attitude toward the 
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upcoming legislation. For example, Panasonic Corp. in their 2012 (20-F) financial statements 
reports:  “Due to an increasing global awareness of CSR values, the Company recently decided to 
extend its commitment to social responsibility by requiring its suppliers to monitor conflict metal 
provision.”  
3) Compliance and/or Production Costs Increase: These companies express the concern that the 
Act will increase compliance and/or production costs. As an example, West Marine Inc. in their 
2014 financial statements (10-K report) mentions: “There are costs associated with complying 
with the disclosure requirements, such as costs related to determining the source of certain 
minerals used in our products, as well as costs of possible changes to products, processes or 
sources of supply as a consequence of such verification activities”. 
4) Reputational Risk: These companies state that the upcoming conflict minerals disclosures will 
increase their reputational risk. As an example, Xilinx Inc. in their 2014 financial statements states 
“We may face reputational challenges if we are unable to sufficiently verify the origins for all 
minerals used in our products through the due diligence process we implement. Moreover, we may 
encounter challenges to satisfy those customers who require that all of the components of our 
products are certified as conflict free” 
5) Operational Risk: These companies state that the Act will adversely impact the company’s 
operations. As an example, Calamp Corp in their 2014 financial statements states, “If we cannot 
guarantee that all products exclude conflict minerals sourced from the DRC, certain number of 
our customers may discontinue, or materially reduce, purchases of the Company’s products, which 
could result in a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition may 
be adversely affected” 
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6) Supply Limitations and Increased Prices: These companies expressed the concern that the 
upcoming conflict minerals legislation will limit their sources of supply. For example, AAON Inc. 
in their 2014 financial statements reports that “As there may be only a limited number of suppliers 
offering “conflict free” conflict minerals, we cannot be sure that we will be able to obtain 
necessary conflict minerals from such suppliers in sufficient quantities or at competitive 
prices”. In addition, Intricon Corp. in their 2014 financial statements reports “The implementation 
of these rules could adversely affect the sourcing, supply, and pricing of materials used in our 
products”.  
7) Legal Liability Risk: Companies point out that the conflict minerals legislation may increase 
legal liability risk, for example, Oracle Corp. in their 2013 financial statements reports, “We 
endeavor to comply with these environmental and other laws, yet compliance with such laws could 
increase our product design, development, procurement, manufacturing and administration costs, 
limit our ability to manage excess and obsolete non-compliant inventory, change our sales 
activities, or otherwise impact future financial results of our hardware systems business. Any 
violation of these laws can subject us to significant liability, including fines, penalties and possible 
prohibition of sales of our products into one or more states or countries” 
8) Sanctions Risk: These companies disclose that failure to comply with the upcoming Act may 
increase sanctions and boycott risk. For example, Volterra Semiconductor Corp. in their 2014 
financial statements reports, “If we, or the subcontractors that we use, fail to timely comply with 
such laws, our customers may refuse to purchase our products”. While Gigoptix Inc. in their 2014 
statements reports that “If we are not able to meet customer requirements, customers may choose 
to disqualify us as a supplier” 
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10) Profitability: These companies disclose that the Act will negatively impact profitability. As an 
example, Standard Microsystems Corp. in its 2012 financial statements reports that, “Compliance 
with this legislation will result in additional expense related to expanded monitoring of the 
Company's supply chain and could result in the Company restricting or modifying the sources 
from which it acquires key minerals needed to manufacture its products, which could adversely 
affect its revenues and profitability”. 
11) Verifiability: These companies disclose information about the difficulty to verify the sources 
and the supply chains. As an example, Anadigics Inc. in its 2014 financial statements reports 
“Since our supply chain is complex, we may not be able to sufficiently verify the origins for these 
minerals and metals used in our products through the due diligence procedures that we implement, 
which may harm our reputation”. In addition, Applied Micocircuits Corp. states that, “… since 
our supply chain is complex and some suppliers will not share their confidential supplier 
information, we may face challenges with our customers and suppliers if we are unable to 
sufficiently verify that the metals used in our products are “conflict free.”. 
6. Results 
6.1. Results of the Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 provides comparative summary statistics (Mean, Median, Lower Quantile (Q1), and 
Upper Quantile (Q3)) and univariate analyses between companies that file Form SD (Panel A) and 
those that did not (Panel B). Filer firms have a greater number of human rights concerns (HRCON), 
greater number of firms ranked as the most admired companies by Fortune (REPUT), and higher 
amount of total audit fees (TAFEES). The mean difference between filers and non-filers for 
HRCON, REPUT, and TAFEES are positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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These results suggest that filer companies are more likely to be associated with higher levels of 
human rights violation risk, greater reputational risk, and higher financial reporting costs. 
Furthermore, filers companies are larger in terms of total assets and market value of equity, are 
associated with lower bid-ask spreads (SPREAD), and tend to belong to the Business Equipment 
industry group. The mean difference between the two groups in terms of ASSETS, MVEQ, 
SPREAD, and INDUST is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
The mean difference in FPSCORE, a proxy for firms’ historical financial performance, defined 
as the factor score from a factor analysis of 13 financial performance measures, is positive and 
significant. Furthermore, the mean difference in 9 out of 13 performance measures is positive and 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the notion that companies which engage in human 
rights violations tend to extract excess rents, in terms of lower minerals prices, and lower wages 
via exploitation, which translate into higher performance. 
In summary, companies that file CMR, have poor human rights performance, higher financial 
reporting costs as evidenced by higher audit fees, higher financial performance, lower spreads, are 
larger in size and more subject to sanction risk, and tend to belong to the Business Equipment and 
Manufacturing industry groups.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
6.2. Results of the Equity market reaction 
Table 3 reports the results of the equity market reaction to announcements of the regulatory 
intervention timeline leading to the passage of the Act. This study’s emphasis is on the aggregate 
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equity market response of all the announcements since it reflects the aggregate of the incremental 
information associated with the probability of success or failure of the bill and its implication on 
security prices. The US regulatory and political process to pass a bill involves input from different 
committees, government agencies, and political groups over an extended period of time, during 
which incremental information is released. As a result, it is the aggregate equity market response 
to all clean announcements (i.e. not confounded by other major news unrelated to conflict 
minerals) instead of a single announcement that we will use to access the impact of the regulatory 
events timeline on market prices.  
For the total sample of 3,640 firms with non-confounding events, the aggregate three-day 
announcement period CAAR is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
However, because the Act is directly applicable to companies which utilize conflict minerals in 
their production processes, the equity market response is anticipated to have a differential impact 
that is dependent on the extent of firms’ reliance and utilization of these minerals in their 
production process. To examine this proposition, we partition the total sample on the basis of 
conflict minerals utilization: Heavy Users vs Medium Users vs No Users (Panel A) and All Users 
vs No Users (Panel B). We then test for the difference in means of the CAAR between All Users 
vs No Users. 
The aggregate three-day CAAR for non-confounding events for the Heavy Users is -2.440 
percent which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For All Users, the CAAR is -2.490 
percent and is statistically significant at the 1 level. For the No Users group, the CAAR is negative 
-1.270 percent, but it is marginally significant. The mean difference in CAAR between All Users 
and No Users is -1.220 percent which is statistically significant at 5 percent level.  
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These results suggest that investors perceive that the passage of the Act will have negative 
economic implications for companies utilizing these minerals in their production process. The 
negative aggregate equity market response is more pronounced for companies which rely heavily 
on conflict minerals relative to companies that are not heavy users. This result suggests that the 
capital market perceives that the Act will have a differential impact on firm value based on the 
extent of the conflict minerals utilization. 
In Summary, the negative equity market reaction to events leading up to the successful approval 
of the Conflict Minerals Act is consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosures under the 
Act will force companies to reveal information detailing the extent of their exposure to human 
rights violations. These disclosures may lead to an increase in reputational, legal liability, 
operational, sanction and boycott risk. Furthermore, the equity market response may reflect 
investors’ expectation of an increase in compliance cost, and a decline in excess rents (profits) due 
to a lack of access to low-priced minerals from conflict zones, that are mined under conditions of 
human rights abuses. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the equity market response to the conflict minerals mandatory 
special disclosures in Form SD. Panel A presents the result for the total sample of 1,154 special 
disclosures filed by companies on Form SD. Companies utilizing conflict minerals in their 
production processes are required to file Form SD, regardless of whether or not the minerals are 
sourced from covered zones (zones where human right abuses are committed). The three-day 
announcement period mean CAAR is negative -0.009 and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
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level. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that investors perceive that mandatory 
disclosures of conflict minerals information in Form SD with regard to company exposure to 
human rights violation risk is associated with a negative valuation effect.  
The negative equity market response associated with such disclosures reflects the capital 
market’s assessment of anticipated increases in reputational, legal liability, sanction and boycott, 
and operational risks and an increase in financial reporting costs. Furthermore, it reflects expected 
losses of excess profits from utilizing minerals sourced at low prices from conflict zones under 
conditions of human right abuses. In cross-sectional and logistic regression analyses we will 
attempt to disentangle these effects and provide further evidence about the determinants of the 
equity market response. 
Table 4, Panel B reports the results of disclosures related to the covered zone and whether 
conflict minerals are mined from the region. Firms in Group B.1 disclose that, based on a 
reasonable country of origin inquiry (RCOI), the company knows or has reason to believe that its 
minerals may have originated in the DRC or adjoining countries (the covered countries). The 
announcement period CAAR is -0.025 and both the mean and the median are statistically 
significant at 1 percent level.  Group B.2 firms disclose that their minerals are sourced from non-
conflict zone and/or from recycled materials or scrap. For this group, the CAAR is positive 0.004 
(0.004) but not significant. The mean difference in CAAR between Group B.1 and B.2 is -0.0297 
which is statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results lend support to the argument that 
corporate exposure to human rights violation risk, as evidenced by sourcing minerals from conflict 
zones is associated with a negative valuation effect. 
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Firms in Group B.3 disclose that, after exercising due diligence the company was not able to 
determine that conflict minerals are not from covered countries or from scrap or recycled materials 
– that is, they have chosen the “undetermined” option. For these companies, the CAAR is negative 
-0.0103 which is statistically significant at conventional levels. It is important to point out that the 
“Undetermined” option will expire by May 31, 2016, and after that date companies need to disclose 
the source of their minerals and whether or not the minerals are sourced from the conflict zone. 
The negative equity market reaction to this group reflects investors’ assessment that companies 
with ambiguous disclosure which disclose the source of its mineral is “Undetermined” are more 
likely sourcing their minerals from the conflict zone. However, they exercise their option to delay 
the disclosure of bad news (sourcing minerals from covered countries) until required by May 31, 
2016.  
Table 4 Panel C presents the results of the equity market response to disclosures related to the 
question of whether or not the proceeds from conflict minerals support armed groups engaged in 
human right abuses. Firms in Group C.1 are those that disclose that in exercising their due 
diligence, the company determines that the proceeds from conflict minerals were not utilized to 
finance or benefit armed groups. The CAAR is positive 0.007 and marginally significant at the 5 
percent level. The CMAR is positive 0.002, but insignificant. No companies report that the 
proceeds from their minerals support armed groups. Firms in Group C.3 disclose that after 
exercising due diligence the company is unable to determine that conflict minerals were not 
utilized to finance armed groups, that is, the source is “Undetermined”. The CAAR is negative -
0.011 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These results lend further support to the 
hypothesis that exposure to human rights violation risk is associated with a negative valuation 
effect.  
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In summary, conflict minerals mandatory disclosures informing investors about the extent of 
corporate exposure to human rights violation under the Act is associated with negative equity 
market reaction. The equity market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source 
their minerals from conflict zones with human rights violations and to companies with ambiguous 
disclosures who fail to disclose the source of its minerals or whether the proceed from their 
minerals support or benefit armed groups engaged in human rights violations. Companies that 
source their minerals from non-conflict zones or obtain their minerals from recycled material or 
scrap and those companies where the proceeds from their minerals do not support armed groups 
are associated with positive, though marginally significant, valuation effect. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure of corporate exposure to human rights 
violations is associated with an increase in reputational, operational, legal liability, sanction and 
boycott risk and losses of excess rents generated from sourcing minerals mined under conditions 
of human rights abuses. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
Table 5 reports the results of 455 firms that disclosed conflict minerals related information in 
their CSR report as part of the annual or the quarterly financial statements (10-K and 10-Q filings). 
The results in Table 5 indicate that in 88.57% of the cases management expresses a negative 
attitude toward the Act, stating that it will adversely impact the company. 11.43% of firms were 
neutral (expressing neither positive nor negative comments). Out of the 455 firms, not one 
company expresses a positive attitude or anticipates a positive outcome.  
With regard to the main concern about the implication of mandatory disclosure about conflict 
minerals information under the Act; 77.14% of firms indicate that the Act will increase compliance 
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and production costs; 69.22% state that disclosures will increase reputational risk; 56.70% indicate 
that the Act will limit the sources of supply of minerals; and 50.55% indicate that it will increase 
the price of minerals. 
Furthermore, Table 5 reports the results of the equity market response around the disclosure 
date (the filing date of the quarterly report) for the total sample of 455 firms as well as the equity 
market response categorized by management’s anticipated impact (negative or neutral) and by 
management’s concerns about the anticipated impact of the Act. The announcement period CAAR 
and the cumulative median abnormal return (CMAR) for the total sample of 455 firms is positive 
but not statistically significant. The lack of a equity market response may reflect the poor quality 
of disclosure in the CSR report and the fact that CSR is part of the annual and quarterly reports 
which incorporate information not related to conflict minerals. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
6.3. Results of Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 6 presents the Pearson (upper segment) and Spearman (lower segment) correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables utilized in the cross-sectional and logistic 
regression analyses. Firm size (SIZE) is positively correlated with audit fees (TAFEES), firm 
reputation (REPUT), historical financial performance (FPSCORE), number of human rights 
concerns (HRCON); and negatively correlated with bid-ask spreads. This suggests that larger 
companies tend to pay higher audit fees, be ranked among the most admired companies by Fortune 
(proxy for firm reputation), have better financial performance, higher number of human rights 
concerns and exposure to human rights violation risk, and lower bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, 
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companies ranked among the most admired by Fortune tend to be larger and pay higher audit fees, 
most likely due to their size. While companies with higher bid-ask spreads tend to have lower 
financial performance (FPSCORE), and lower audit fees (TAFEES), and are less likely to be 
ranked among the most admired companies, most likely driven by firm size. We tackle the problem 
of multicollinearity among independent variables by estimating the cross-sectional regression 
models with and without such correlated variables.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
Tables 7 and 8 report the results of a cross-sectional analysis where the dependent variable is 
the three-day announcement period CAAR for firms that file Form SD. Since the proxy for 
financial reporting quality (FRQ) has the least number of observations relative to other variables, 
we estimate the regression models with (results reported in Table 7 with N= 951) and without 
(results reported in Table 8 with N=1122) FRQ in order to gain more information by including 
more observations in the analysis.  
In Table 7 the proxies for corporate exposure to human rights violation risk including CZONE 
(whether the company source its minerals from the covered zone, or not), HRCON (the number of 
reported cases of human rights concerns), and ARMGRP (whether the proceeds from the 
company’s minerals support armed groups engaged in human right violations), carry the 
anticipated sign and are statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure of information revealing the extent of corporate exposure 
to human rights violation is a significant factor that negatively impacts firm value.    
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SANCTION, which is a proxy for sanction and boycott risk, is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level across the five models, suggesting that mandatory disclosures of 
conflict minerals information is expected to have a stronger negative equity market response for 
companies located in states with regulations to sanctions companies with exposure to human right 
violation risk.  
REPUT is a proxy for firm reputational risk. Companies with a significant amount of 
reputational capital are less likely to engage in human right violations. As anticipated, REPUT is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level across all model specifications. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that corporate engagement in human rights violation will expose 
firms to reputational risk and have a negative impact on firm value. 
Total audit fees (TAFEES), a proxy for financial reporting costs, is negative and statistically 
significant across the five regression model specifications. Mandatory disclosures of conflict 
minerals information will impose additional financial reporting cost in terms of verifiability and 
additional auditing requirements. The SEC estimates that the cost of first compliance for the Act 
could be between 3 and 4 billon dollars (Woody, 2012). Furthermore, companies need to spend 
between $200 to $400 million dollars for continuous compliance with the provisions of the Act 
(Sarfaty, 2013). In a study conducted by the US National Association of Manufacturers, the actual 
cost of compliance with Section 1502 could reach $8 to $16 billion (Woody 2012). Companies 
characterized by higher financial reporting costs are more likely to suffer higher compliance costs 
and have a stronger negative equity market reaction. 
FRQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality. Companies with superior financial reporting 
quality are less likely to expose themselves to human rights violation risk, and hence, be less likely 
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to be severely impacted by conflict minerals disclosures. FRQ is negative, though it is not 
significant in any of the models specifications.  
FPSCORE, a proxy for firm’s historical financial performance is positive, however, it is only 
marginally significant in model 4. The hypothesis that companies with superior financial 
performance are less likely to be impacted by the additional costs of compliance and more capable 
to weather additional risks associated with conflict minerals disclosures, is only marginally 
supported.  
SPREAD, which is a proxy for the degree of transparency and information asymmetry, defined 
as the bid-ask spread, is negative and statistically significant at 0.10 level. These results suggest 
mandatory disclosures on Form SD will force less transparent companies to reveal more 
information about the extent of their exposure to human rights violations, hence, these companies 
are more likely to have a stronger negative equity market reaction.  
SIZE is a proxy for firm size defined as the log of total assets. SIZE is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level across all models. This finding supports the hypothesis that larger 
companies bear lower costs of compliance with the Act due to economies of scale in financial 
reporting costs. INDUST is a proxy for industry affiliation defined as an indicator variable equal 1 
if the company belongs to the Business Equipment (computers, software, and electronic 
equipment’s) and Telecommunications groups based on Fama-French (1997) 12-industry 
classification scheme. These are the types of industries that can be classified as heavy users of 
conflict minerals and thus are more likely to be the most impacted by the mandatory disclosures. 
Consistent with my predictions, INDUST is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level in all models.  
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The explanatory power of all the models is very reasonable with F-values ranging from 26.60 
to 34.20 which are statistically significant at the 0.10 percent level. Adjusted R-squares range from 
0.189 to 0.229 which suggest a reasonable explanatory power. Table 8 presents the results from 
estimating the same models in Table 7 without the inclusion of the FRQ variable. This is because 
FRQ has the least number of observations. Hence, to gain more information from using a larger 
sample we estimate the models without FRQ. As shown in Table 8, the results to a large extent 
echo those in Table 7. This suggests that the results are robust to a relatively smaller sample size.  
[Insert Tables 7 & 8 Here] 
 
6.4. Results of the Logistic Regression 
To examine the unique characteristics of companies filing the special conflict minerals 
disclosures in Form SD we estimate a logistic regression model were the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the company files Form SD, and zero for non-filers. Table 9 reports 
the results of the logistic regression with FRQ included while Table 10 reports the results without 
FRQ.  In Table 9, HRCON, a proxy for human rights violation risk is positive, as anticipated and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that companies with higher numbers 
of human right concerns are more likely to file Form SD. SANCTION is positive as anticipated; 
however, it is not statistically significant in any of the model specifications. REPUT, a proxy for 
firm’s reputational capital, is negative in all models, though it is significant in three out of five 
models. These results suggest that companies which are sensitive to reputational capital are less 
likely to source minerals from conflict zones, and hence, be less likely to file Form SD.    
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TAFEES, a proxy for financial reporting costs, is positive in all model specifications and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent. This suggests that filers of the conflict minerals report are 
more likely to be companies associated with higher financial reporting costs as evidenced by 
higher total audit fees.  
FPSCORE,  a proxy for firm’s financial performance is positive and statistically significant in 
all models at conventional levels, which suggests that filer firms are more likely to have higher 
historical financial performance relative to non-filers. 
SPREAD, a proxy for transparency and information asymmetry, is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent across all the models. This suggests that filers of Form SD tend to be 
less transparent and characterized by higher degrees of information asymmetry (this may reflect 
the fact that a significant number of conflict minerals users are high-tech and electronics companies 
which are characterized by operational complexities and thus higher degree of information 
asymmetry). 
SIZE is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels; these results suggest that 
filers companies tend to be larger in size relative to non-filers. INDUST, a proxy that captures 
industry effects, is positive and it is highly significant across the seven regression models. These 
findings suggest that companies within the Business equipment sector are more likely to be filers, 
likely due to the fact that these companies tend to be heavy users of conflict minerals.   
The logistic regression models have a reasonable explanatory power with Pseudo R-square 
ranging from 0.079 to 0.11 across all regression models.  Table 10 reports the results of estimating 
the same models in Table 9 but without the FRQ variable, and the results echo those in Table 9. 
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[Insert Tables 9 & 10 Here] 
 
In summary, companies filing the conflict minerals mandatory disclosures under Section 1502 
of the Act are characterized by poor human rights performance (higher number of human rights 
concerns), lower levels of reputational capital, higher financial reporting costs, higher historical 
financial performance, lower transparency, larger size, and a greater likelihood of belonging to the 
Business Equipment industry relative to non-filer firms.  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The Act, which requires mandatory disclosure on conflict mineral usage for all US registered 
firms, was implemented to encourage companies to manage their supply chains in a manner that 
avoids human rights abuse. Proponents of the Act believe that decreased use of conflict minerals 
will reduce support to armed groups that fuel the ongoing conflict in the DRC and adjoining 
countries. Opponents of the legislation believe that its benefits do not justify reputation, sanction 
and compliance costs to individual firms, or the costs that might be imposed on the DRC economy 
arising from reprisals by marginalized rebel groups or trade sanctions from firms wary of 
conducting business in the region. To contribute to this current and important debate, we 
empirically examine the linkage between the human rights, corporate disclosure and financial 
reporting by examining the equity market reaction to disclosures under the Act. 
Using a large and inclusive sample, we assess the market’s perception of the rule and its 
effectiveness by examining the individual and the aggregate equity equity market response to 
several regulatory events relevant to the conflict mineral regulation. We find that investors react 
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negatively to events that signal an increase in the likelihood of the passage of the conflict minerals 
legislation. 
Our results suggest that mandatory disclosures under the Act provide information to investors 
about reputational, legal liability, operational, and sanction and boycott risk. The results are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that prior to the passage of the Act, investors were anticipating an 
increase in compliance cost, and a decline in profits.  
Likewise, mandatory conflict minerals disclosures on Form SD informing investors about the 
extent of corporate exposure to human rights violation is associated with negative equity market 
reaction. The market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source their minerals 
from conflict zones with human rights violations, and to companies with ambiguous disclosures 
about their support of armed groups or the source of their minerals. These results support the notion 
that disclosure of corporate exposure to human right violation as mandated under the Act, is 
associated with an increase in reputational, operational, legal liability, sanction and boycott risk 
and loss of excess rents. 
We also provide information about firms’ concerns about the new legislation by examining the 
early disclosures of human rights concerns in CSR reports. The majority of the firms in the early 
disclosure sample express a negative attitude towards the Act, citing concerns about increases in 
compliance and production costs and reputation risk. However, the equity market reaction to early 
voluntary disclosure in CSR reports was not found to be statistically significant, indicating noise 
or poor quality of traditional CSR disclosures. 
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Finally, the logistic regression analysis sheds light on which unique firm characteristics are 
associated with greater exposure to human right violation risk. We find that firms with poor human 
rights performance, lower reputational capital, higher financial reporting costs, lower financial 
performance, and greater information asymmetry are all determinants of human right violation risk.  
Overall, the findings suggest an economic justification for companies with poor conflict 
minerals practices to improve, and avoid the reputational damage and high litigation and sanction 
costs that will arise from the new conflict minerals disclosure requirements. This paper provides a 
strong endorsement of the effectiveness of the format of the new mandatory Form SD, in that the 
information produced provides information that allows the market assess human rights risk. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. Although the sample of Form SD disclosures is large, 
we do not fully capture the capital market reaction to the Act for the following two reasons. First, 
the sample of Conflict Mineral Disclosures in Form SD is still incomplete. Many companies are 
still in the early stages of their compliance exercises. A survey conducted by Price Warehouse 
Coopers (PWC 2014) reports that 26% of respondents were either finalizing scoping or planning 
and performing their reasonable country of origin inquiry (RCOI) but had yet to evaluate RCOI 
responses, with 11% still in the product scoping stage (PWC, 2014). This delay of firm’s 
disclosures will reduce the number of firms in the sample. Second, the conflict mineral status 
disclosed by some companies is still ambiguous. According to the final rule (Release No. 34-67716) 
by SEC (2012), during the transition period17 for the implementation, companies are allowed the 
option to disclose their conflict mineral status as “undeterminable”. Likely to avoid risks, some 
companies have chosen this option, rather than exercise the costly due diligence that they would 
                                                             
17 Transition Period: two years for big companies and four years for small companies 
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have to conduct in the event they use conflict minerals from the conflict zones or support armed 
groups. This ambiguity in expression will affect the classification for the sample companies and 
influence the judgments on the exact equity market reaction to this new regulation. 
Along with the continuous implementation, the transition period for conflict mineral disclosure 
will end by 2016 for large filers and 2018 for smaller companies (SEC, 2012). At that time the 
disclosure option of “undeterminable” will be unacceptable and independent private sector audits 
are required for all issuers (KPMG, 2013). We leave it to future research to explore further 
determinants of the equity market reaction. 
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List of Tables  
Table 1: Frequency Distribution by Fama-French Industry Classification Code 
Frequency distribution by industry group based on Fama-French industry classification code for the total sample, companies file conflict minerals report Form SD, and companies do not file 
Form SD. Industry Group numbering reference is 1.Consumer Non-Durables: Food, Tobacco, Textiles, and Apparel; 2. Consumer Durables: Cars, TV’s, Furniture, and Appliances; 3. 
Manufacturing: Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Papers, and Printing; 4. Energy: Oil, Gas, and Coal Extractions; 6. Business Equipment: Computers, Software, and Electronic Equip.7. Business 
Equipment: Computers, Software, and Electronic Equip; 8. Utilities; 9. Shops Wholesale, Retail, and some Services; 10. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs; 11. Money and Finance 
(Excluded from the sample); and 12. Others: Mines, construction, Building Materials, etc. CZONE1 is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that it source 
minerals from conflict zone and zero otherwise. CZONE2 is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone or the source of 
its minerals is undetermined and zero otherwise HRCON  is indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the period 2011-2013 as reported by KLD database 
and zero otherwise. ARMGRP is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do not support armed groups. ARMGRP2 
is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals is undeterminable on wither it support armed groups or not. SANCTION 
is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, these state passed regulations to 
sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. REPUT is a proxy for firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company is one of the 
most admired companies as ranked by Fortune over the period from 2011 through 2013. All firms is the total sample of companies with return available on the CRSP and or data available 
on the COMPUSTAT database 
Industry All Firms No Form SD File Form SD CZONE1 CZONE2 HRCON ARMGRP1 ARMGRP2 REPUT SANCTION 
Group N % N % N % N % n % n % n % n 5 n % n % 
1 248 5.64 199 6.24 49 4.04 3 1.65 22 2.52 34 4.01 3 4.29 19 2.39 8 5.06 9 3.88 
2 113 2.57 42 1.32 71 5.86 7 3.85 55 6.30 54 6.37 4 5.71 50 6.30 10 6.33 4 1.72 
3 440 10.00 181 5.68 259 21.39 43 23.63 190 21.76 200 23.58 16 22.86 169 21.28 36 22.78 18 7.76 
4 313 7.12 277 8.69 36 2.97 2 1.10 22 2.52 26 3.07 2 2.86 20 2.52 7 4.43 1 0.43 
5 115 2.61 77 2.42 38 3.14 6 3.30 19 2.18 38 4.48 3 4.29 16 2.02 5 3.16 1 0.43 
6 907 20.62 500 15.68 407 33.61 78 42.86 325 37.23 256 30.19 20 28.57 303 38.16 39 24.68 134 57.76 
7 179 4.07 160 5.02 19 1.57 4 2.2 14 1.60 7 0.83 0 0 14 1.76 3 1.90 4 2.16 
8 164 3.73 156 4.89 8 0.66 1 0.55 5 0.57 7 0.83 0 0 5 0.63 0 0 1 0.43 
9 452 10.28 323 10.13 129 10.65 12 6.59 79 9.05 101 11.91 14 20.00 67 8.44 30 18.99 18 8.62 
10 782 17.78 637 19.98 145 11.97 20 10.99 111 12.71 94 11.08 5 7.14 102 12.85 14 8.86 37 15.95 
12 686 15.59 636 19.95 50 4.13 6 3.30 31 3.55 31 3.66 3 4.29 29 3.65 6 3.80 2 0.86 
All 4399 100 3188 100 1211 100 182 100 873 100 848 100 70 100 794 100 158 100 232 100 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis  
A summary statistics (Mean, Median, Lower Quantile (Q1, and the Upper Quantile (Q3)) and univariate analysis between companies file the conflict minerals Form SD (Panel A) and 
companies do not file Form SD (Panel B). HRCON is an indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the period 2011-2013 as reported by KLD database and 
zero otherwise. REPUT is a proxy for firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes over the period from 
2011 through 2013 and zero otherwise. TAFEES, AFEES, and NAFEES are dollar amount of the total audit fees, audit fees and non-audit fees, from Audit Analytics for the year before the 
announcement year. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, 
these state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. SPREAD is bid-ask spread defined as [(the High closing price-the Low 
closing price)/ (High closing price + the Low closing price)/2]*100. INDUST is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and 
electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and televisions) based on Fama-French industry classification scheme. FPSCORE is a proxy for firm’s financial performance 
defined as the factor scores from a factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of financial performance. FRQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality utilizing three measures of financial reporting 
quality.  D-Mean and D-Median is the difference in the means and median between the mean and median in Panel A: companies file Form SD and Panel B: Companies does not file Form SD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Panel A: Companies File Form SD Panel B: Companies does not File Form SD Difference in 
Variable N Mean Median Q1 Q3 N Mean Median Q1 Q3 D-Mean D-Median 
HRCON 1211 0.700 1.000 0.000 1.000 3188 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.212 1.000 
REPUT 1211 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000 3188 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.080 0.000 
TAFEES 1209 4.482 1.789 0.824 4.512 2612 2.026 0.884 0.356 2.027 2.456 0.905 
AFFEES 1209 3.539 1.509 0.714 3.602 2612 1.671 0.759 0.305 1.653 1.868 0.750 
NAFEES 1209 0.942 0.220 0.047 0.769 2612 0.390 0.078 0.014 0.298 0.552 0.142 
SANCTION 1211 0.211 0.000 0.000 1.000 3188 0.176 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 
SPREAD 769 58.813 52.737 41.157 71.153 2409 76.001 68.823 47.665 98.869 -17.188 -16.086 
INDUST 1211 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000 3188 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.145 0.000 
FPSCORE 1126 0.150 0.310 0.080 0.440 2520 -0.129 0.231 -0.192 0.393 0.279 0.079 
ROA 1126 0.003 0.012 -0.001 0.021 2520 -0.011 0.006 -0.015 0.016 0.014 0.018 
ROE 1126 0.004 0.023 -0.002 0.042 2520 -0.032 0.013 -0.031 0.034 0.036 0.036 
ROS 1126 -0.119 0.041 -0.010 0.088 2520 -0.847 0.021 -0.111 0.080 0.728 0.020 
EVA 1126 0.014 0.021 0.007 0.031 2520 0.001 0.014 -0.005 0.027 0.013 0.007 
EVADA 1126 0.025 0.030 0.017 0.042 2520 0.013 0.025 0.008 0.040 0.012 0.005 
EPS 1126 -0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.018 2520 -0.017 0.007 -0.021 0.016 0.016 0.005 
QEARN 1126 1.463 1.312 0.612 2.019 2520 1.318 1.180 0.152 2.396 0.145 0.132 
TOBQ 1126 1.582 1.254 0.895 1.866 2520 1.725 1.197 0.817 1.915 -0.143 0.057 
MVA 1126 0.714 0.373 0.009 0.992 2520 0.792 0.236 -0.181 1.016 -0.078 0.609 
EPSG 1126 -0.101 0.034 -0.459 0.278 2520 -0.145 0.017 -0.665 0.326 0.044 0.017 
SALEG 1126 0.034 0.019 0.001 0.043 2520 0.060 0.022 -0.001 0.065 -0.026 -0.003 
RETH 1126 0.064 0.059 0.025 0.095 2520 0.059 0.054 0.006 0.110 0.005 0.005 
ABRD 1126 -0.084 -0.009 -0.701 0.694 2520 -0.283 -0.159 -1.054 0.692 0.199 0.150 
REPSCORE 931 0.149 0.057 -0.332 0.574 1914 -0.186 -0.216 -0.662 0.288 0.335 0.273 
FRQ 988 0.010 -0.002 -0.210 0.231 1702 -0.017 0.006 -0.270 0.281 0.027 -0.008 
MJON 988 0.005 0.005 -0.018 0.028 1702 0.000 0.005 -0.029 0.034 0.005 0.000 
JONMPM 988 -0.001 0.001 -0.039 -0.038 1702 -0.002 -0.001 -0.052 0.048 0.001 0.002 
FLOSIC 988 0.001 0.000 -0.017 0.018 1702 -0.000 0.001 -0.024 0.025 0.001 0.000 
MVEQ (M$) 1127 7547 932 252 3994 2608 2992 364 72 1621 4555 568 
ASSETS (M$) 1209 9421 1085 264 4358 3163 4880 394 87 2030 4540 691 
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Table 3: The Equity Market Response to Announcements of Regulatory Timeline of Conflict Minerals Rules 
The table depict the stock market reaction to announcements of regulatory timeline to the passage of Conflict Minerals Act 1502. CAAR is the announcement period Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns over the period from day t-1 through day t+1 relative to the announcement day t0, the average abnormal returns is generated utilizing the market adjusted returns 
methodology. Confounding Effect is whether the event date is confounded by other major announcements over the three-day window from day t-1 through day t+1; description of the 
confounding events is listed under each event date description in Appendix A.  All represent a sample of all companies that are subject to the Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank Conflict minerals 
regardless of the extent of their usage of these minerals (3TG) and whether such minerals are conflict minerals or not.  Heavy Users are companies that depends heavily on the subject minerals 
in their production process, regardless of the source, whether it’s a recycled minerals or it’s from the conflict zones or not.  Medium Users are those companies with medium usage of the 
3TG in their processes. All Users are the heavy and medium users as defined before. No Users are those companies that do not use these minerals. Difference is the difference in the CAAR 
between All Users-No Users. Aggregate CAAR-All is the announcement-period cumulative average abnormal returns aggregated over all the events for both confounding and non-confounding 
events. Aggregate CAAR-Clean is the announcement period CAAR for the clean (non-confounding events). ***, **, * denoted a level of significance at one, five, and ten percent level.  
Announcement Date Confounding Effect All Firms  Heavy Users   Medium Users  All Users  No Users Difference 
E1- May 22, 2008 Confounded  0.670***   0.970***  0.690***  0.900***  0.360***  0.540 
E2- April 23, 2009 Confounded  1.490***   0.870**  1.170*  0.870***  2.270*** -1.400 
E3- July 21, 2010  Confounded  0.820***   0.360  0.980***  0.510  1.210*** -0.700 
E4- September 11, 2010 Clean  0.290   0.490**  0.140  0.320  0.130  0.190 
E5- December 15, 2010 Confounded  0.320***   0.670***  0.080  0.530**  0.060*  0.470 
E6- April 7, 2011 Clean -0.250*** -0.270*** -0.250* -0.250*** -0.240*** -0.010 
E7- May 25, 2011 Clean  0.630***   0.850***  0.220  0.700***  0.530***  0.170 
E8- July 15, 2011 Clean -0.710*** -0.930*** -1.230*** -1.010*** -0.360*** -0.650 
E9- September 16, 2011 Clean -1.240*** -1.280*** -0.940*** -1.200*** -1.290***  0.090 
E10- October 3, 2011 Confounded -1.310*** -1.100*** -0.940*** -1.020*** -1.630***  0.610 
E11- October 9, 2011 Clean  0.150 -0.070 -0.100 -0.070  0.420 -0.490 
E12- May 2, 2012 Clean -0.710*** -0.630*** -0.710*** -0.650*** -0.780***  0.130 
E13- August 22, 2012 Clean  0.160   0.190 -0.230*   0.090  0.250 -0.160 
E14- October 19, 2012 Clean -0.480*** -1.090*** -0.050 -0.760 -0.040 -0.720 
E15- March 26, 2013 Clean -0.130 -0.370  0.000 -0.190  0.050 -0.240 
E16- July 23, 2013 Confounded  0.400*   0.050*  0.180  0.430  0.360  0.070 
        
No. of Observation  3640 1505 454 1959 1681  
Aggregate CAAR-All  0.100 -1.290 -0.990 -0.800 1.300 -2.100** 
Aggregate CAAR-Clean  -1.970** -2.440*** -3.070*** -2.490*** -1.270 -1.220** 
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Table 4: Equity market reaction to Disclosures of Conflict Minerals Information in Form SD 
The equity market reaction to conflict minerals disclosures in Form SD. CAAR is the three-day (day t-1 through t1) announcement period average market adjusted abnormal return. CMAR 
is the median cumulative average abnormal returns. Panel A: present the total number of firms filed special disclosure (Form SD) conflict minerals report. Companies which utilize the 
Cassiterite (Tin), Columbite-tantalite (Tantalum), Wolframite (Tungsten), and Gold (3TG) whether it is sourced from covered countries or not are required under Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to file Form SD Special Disclosure conflict mineral report. These companies disclose that conflict minerals (3TG) are necessary to 
the functionality or production of the product manufactured or contracted to be manufactured. Panel B reports the results of the covered zone disclosures. (The covered countries include, The 
DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, The Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). B.1. Conflict Zone: Based on a reasonable country of 
origin inquiry (RCOI), the company know or have reason to believe that the conflict minerals may have originated in the DRC or an adjoining country (the covered countries). B.2. No 
Conflict Zone: Through exercising due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals the company determined that the conflict minerals are not from the covered 
countries or are from scrap or recycled. B.3. Undetermined: After exercising due diligence the company was not able to determine that conflict minerals are not from the covered countries 
or are from scraps or recycled. Panel C: present the results related to disclosure on whether the proceeds from conflict minerals support armed groups. C.1. No Support to Armed Group: In 
exercising due diligence, the company determined that the conflict minerals were not utilized finance or to benefit armed groups. C.2. Support Armed Groups: the company determined that 
the conflict minerals were utilized finance or to benefit armed groups. C.3. Undetermined: After exercising due diligence the company was is not able to determine that the conflict minerals 
were not utilized finance or to benefit armed groups. C.4. Not Required: companies who does not source minerals from covered countries are not required to provide such information.  ***, 
**, * denotes level of significance at one, five, and 10 percent.  
Sample/Subsample Prediction N CAAR CMAR 
Panel A: Total Number of Firms Filed Conflict Minerals Report Special Disclosure Form Negative 1154 -0.94*** -0.69** 
Panel B: Covered Zone 
B.1. Conflict Zone: Conflict Minerals Sourced from Conflict Zone  Negative 191 -2.54*** -1.20*** 
B.2. No Conflict Zone: Conflict minerals Sourced from Non-conflict zone and/or recycled or scrap. Positive 270  0.43*  0.43* 
B.3. Undetermined Negative 677 -1.03*** -0.69** 
B.4. No Information provided in Form SD Negative 16 N/A N/A 
Panel C: Conflict Minerals Proceed Support Armed Groups 
C.1. No Support to Armed Groups Positive 70  0.74**  0.15 
C.2. Support Arm Groups Negative 0  N/A  N/A 
C.3. Undetermined Negative 795 -1.10*** -0.73** 
C.4. Not Required Pos./Neg. 260 N/A N/A 
C.5. No Information provided in Form SD  Pos./Neg. 29 N/A N/A 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Table 5: The Equity Market Reaction to Conflict Minerals Related Early Disclosures in the CSR Report 
Corporate attitudes toward and their concerns with regard to Section 1502 Conflict Minerals Act as disclosed in their Corporate Social Responsibility reports. It is defined as early disclosures 
because it is disclosed in the CSR reports before the mandatory filings date (June 2, 2014) of the Special disclosure forms (Form SD). N is the number of companies with CSR information 
related to conflict minerals, Percent is the percentage out of 455 companies disclosed conflict minerals information in their  CSR reports. Mean CAAR is the three-day cumulative average 
abnormal returns. CMAR is the cumulative median announcement period abnormal returns. Negative attitude indicate that company’s disclosures in CSR report indicate their dissatisfaction 
toward Section 1502. Neutral, disclosures in the CSR report does show either positive or negative attitude toward conflict minerals legislation (note that we do not have any company shows a 
positive attitude toward conflict minerals). Costs Increase: indicate that conflict minerals legislation will increase the cost of compliance and production costs. Reputational Risk, companies 
indicate that compliance with the legislation will expose the company to reputational risk.   Operational Risk: Legislation will negatively impact company’s operation. Supply Limitation: 
Legislation will limit the sources of supply of minerals. Legal Liability Risk:  disclosure of conflict minerals will expose the company to legal liability risk.   Sanction Risk: Disclosures of 
conflict minerals will increase companies and/or products sanction and boycott risk by costumers and public at large. Competitive Supply Prices: Legislation will cause an increase in the price 
of minerals and make it less competitive. Profitability: Legislation will negatively impact corporate profitability. Verifiability: it is difficult to verify the sources of conflict minerals and 
weather the proceeds from these minerals support armed groups or not. 
Sample/Subsample N (Percent) CAAR CMAR 
1.All Disclosures 455 (100.00%)  0.12  0.03 
2. Negative Attitude toward Conflict Minerals Legislation 403   (88.57%) -0.02 -0.07 
3. Neutral Attitude toward Conflict Minerals Legislation   52   (11.43%)  1.15**  0.43 
4. Costs Increase: The Act will increase compliance costs/production costs 351   (77.14%) -0.09 -0.07 
5. Reputational Risk: Disclosures will increase reputational risk 274   (69.22%) -0.21 -0.12 
6. Operation: Will negatively impact company’s operations    49   (10.77%)  0.72*  0.20 
7. Supply Limitations: Legislation will limit sources of supply 258   (56.70%) -0.19 -0.20 
8. Legal Liability Risk: Legislation will increase legal liability   22    (04.84%)  1.10*  1.37* 
9. Sanctions Risk: Disclosures will increase sanctions and boycott risk  148   (32.53%) -0.16 -0.11 
10. Competitive supply prices: legislation will increase prices of minerals. 230   (50.55%)  0.10 -0.10 
11. Profitability: Legislation will negatively impact profitability     9    (01.98%)  0.61  0.58 
12. Verifiability: Difficulty to verify the sources and the supply chains    77    (16.92%) -0.10 -0.08 
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Table 6: Person (upper segment) and Spearman (lower segment) Correlation Coefficients among the Independent Variables 
HRCON is indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the period 2011-2013 as reported by KLD database and zero otherwise. CZONE1 an indicator variable 
equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone and zero otherwise. CZONE2 an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD 
that it source minerals from conflict zone or the source of its minerals is undetermined and zero otherwise. ARMGRP is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD 
that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do not support armed groups. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, 
and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, these state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. FPSCORE is a proxy for 
firm’s financial performance defined as the factor scores from a factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of financial performance. FRQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality utilizing three 
measures of financial reporting quality. REPUT is a proxy for firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes 
over the period from 2011 through 2013. TAFEES is dollar amount of the total audit fees from Audit Analytics for the year before the announcement year. SPREAD is bid-ask spread defined 
as [(the High closing price-the Low closing price)/ (High closing price + the Low closing price)/2]*100. SIZE is the log of total assets for the year before the announcement year. INDUST is 
an indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and televisions) based 
on Fama-French industry classification scheme. The segment above diagonal is the person correlation coefficients and below diagonal are the Spearman correlation coefficients. Letter bold 
indicate a level of significance at 10 percent level or below. (N=1154) 
 
VARIABLES HRCON CZONE1 CZONE2 ARMGRP SANCTION FPSCORE FRQ REPUT TAFEES SPREAD SIZE INDUST 
HRCON  1.000  0.041  0.098  0.056  0.096  0.205 -0.012  0.059  0.037 -0.246  0.246 -0.131 
CZONE1  0.041  1.000  0.260  0.143  0.041 -0.031 -0.030  0.063  0.097  0.009  0.081  0.097 
CZONE2  0.098  0.260  1.000  0.153  0.099 -0.019 -0.019 -0.008  0.055 -0.018  0.026  0.127 
ARMGRP  0.053  0.143  0.153  1.000 -0.031  0.036 -0.005  0.135  0.101 -0.038  0.119 -0.034 
SANCTION  0.096  0.041  0.099 -0.031  1.000 -0.172 -0.039 -0.046 -0.087  0.124 -0.114  0.254 
FPSCORE  0.194 -0.026 -0.023  0.034 -0.212  1.000 -0.010  0.146  0.152 -0.551  0.437 -0.121 
FRQ -0.025 -0.039 -0.042 -0.001 -0.045 -0.013  1.000 -0.062 -0.040  0.012 -0.076 -0.027 
REPUT  0.059  0.063 -0.008  0.135 -0.046  0.208 -0.080  1.000  0.545 -0.255  0.514 -0.069 
TAFEES  0.265  0.089  0.061  0.113 -0.051  0.318 -0.092  0.433 1.000 -0.265  0.651 -0.091 
SPREAD -0.215  0.007  0.001 -0.031  0.142 -0.510  0.032 -0.302 -0.439  1.000 -0.497  0.194 
SIZE  0.238  0.088  0.021  0.119 -0.128  0.419 -0.098  0.479  0.905 -0.518  1.000 -0.141 
INDUST -0.131  0.088  0.127 -0.034  0.254 -0.235 -0.035 -0.069 -0.029  0.188 -0.147  1.000 
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Table 7: Results of the Cross-Sectional regression Analysis - with FRQ 
The table reports the results from a cross-sectional regression model specified as: 
CAAR = β0 + β1 CZONE + β2 HRCON + β3 ARMGRP + β4 SANCTION + β5REPUT + β6 TAFEES + β7 FRQ+ β8 FPSCORE + β9 SIZE + β10 SPREAD + β11 INDUST + ε;  
Where: CAAR = the three-day period (t-1 to t+1) cumulative average abnormal return around the disclosure date of Form SD; CZONE is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed 
in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone and zero otherwise. HRCON  is indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the period 2011-2013 
as reported by KLD database and zero otherwise. ARMGRP is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do not support 
armed groups. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, these 
state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. REPUT is a proxy for firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 
if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes over the period from 2011 through 2013.  TAFEES is dollar amount of the total audit fees from Audit Analytics 
for the year before the announcement year. FRQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality utilizing three measures of financial reporting quality. FPSCORE is a proxy for firm’s financial 
performance defined as the factor scores from a factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of financial performance. SIZE is the log of total assets for the year before the announcement year. 
SPREAD is bid-ask spread defined as [(the High closing price-the Low closing price)/ (High closing price + the Low closing price)/2]*100. INDUST is an indicator variable equal 1 if the 
company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and televisions) based on Fama-French industry 
classification scheme. TSTAT is the value of the Test statistics. HCTV is the Hetroscedastically consistent T-value. ADJRSQR is the adjusted R square, and F-Value is the F-Value test statistics 
of the regression model. 
Model No.  
PSIGN 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV 
INTERCEPT P/N -0.009   -1.140 -1.290  0.015    2.730  2.970 -0.015   -2.940 -3.000  0.005    1.450  1.570  0.016    3.110  3.430 
CZONE NEG -0.053 -13.750 -7.960 -0.053 -13.350 -7.390 -0.053 -13.930 -7.960 -0.052 -13.390 -7.730 -0.053 -13.530 -7.430 
HRCON NEG -0.016   -4.610 -4.560 -0.012   -3.680 -3.590 -0.013   -4.040 -4.120 -0.009   -3.100 -3.050 -0.010   -3.210 -3.240 
ARMGRP POS  0.040  11.060  5.910  0.039  10.580  5.550  0.040  11.370  5.980  0.039  10.820  5.790  0.039   10.870  5.640 
SANCTION NEG -0.011  -3.670 -2.740 -0.010   -3.330 -2.510 -0.011   -3.800 -2.780 -0.011   -3.610 -2.660 -0.010   -3.430 -2.590 
REPUT POS  0.019   4.530 -4.200  na    na   na -0.021  -4.850 -4.410 -0.025   -7.220 -7.260  na   na  na 
TAFEES NEG -0.001  -1.570 -2.150 -0.002   -4.010 -5.910 -0.001  -1.550 -2.100  na    na  na -0.002   -4.170 -6.080 
FRQ NEG -0.002  -0.870 -0.700 -0.001   -0.440 -0.370 -0.002  -0.880 -0.720 -0.002   -0.660 -0.540 -0.001   -0.400 -0.350 
FPSCORE POS  0.001   0.610  0.520  0.004    1.710  1.430  na   na  na  0.005    2.870  2.260  na   na  na 
SIZE POS  0.004   3.540  4.030  na     na  na  0.004   4.230  4.420  na    na  na  na   na  na 
SPREAD NEG -0.000 -0.870 -0.910 -0.001   -2.090 -2.230  na   na  na  na    na  na -0.001  -3.240 -3.340 
INDUST NEG -0.007 -2.750 -2.500 -0.006   -2.410 -2.150 -0.007  -2.700 -2.480 -0.006  -2.310 -2.070 -0.006  -2.390 -2.150 
       
NO. of Obs.  951 951 951 953 980 
ADJRSQR  0.2286 0.1955 0.2214 0.2183 0.1893 
F-VALUE  26.590 26.650 32.090 34.230 29.570 
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Table 8: Results of the Cross-Sectional regression Analysis - without FRQ 
The table reports the results from a cross-sectional regression model specified as: 
CAAR = β0 + β1 CZONE + β2 HRCON + β3 ARMGRP + β4 SANCTION + β5 REPUT + β6 TAFEES + β7 FPSCORE + β8 SIZE + β9 SPREAD + β10 INDUST + ε; 
Where: CAAR = the three-day period (t-1 to t+1) cumulative average abnormal return around the disclosure date of Form SD; CZONE is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed 
in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone and zero otherwise. HRCON is an indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the period 2011-
2013 as reported by KLD database and zero otherwise. ARMGRP is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do not 
support armed groups. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, 
these state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. REPUT is a proxy for firm reputation and it is an indicator variable 
equal 1 if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes over the period from 2011 through 2013.  TAFEES is dollar amount of the total audit fees from Audit 
Analytics for the year before the announcement year. FPSCORE is a proxy for firm’s financial performance defined as the factor scores from a factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of 
financial performance. SIZE is the log of total assets for the year before the announcement year. SPREAD is bid-ask spread defined as [(the High closing price-the Low closing price)/ (High 
closing price + the Low closing price)/2]*100. INDUST is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) 
and Telecommunications (telephone and televisions) based on Fama-French industry classification scheme. TSTAT is the value of the Test statistics. HCTV is the Hetroscedastically consistent 
T-value. ADJRSQR is the adjusted R square, and F-Value is the F-Value test statistics of the regression model. 
Model No.  
PSIGN 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VARIABLES PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV PEST TSTAT HCTV 
INTERCEPT P/N -0.009   -1.340 -1.430  0.009    1.970  2.180 -0.015   -3.260 -3.170  0.002    0.840  0.940  0.010    2.570  2.940 
CZONE NEG -0.049 -13.610 -7.750 -0.049 -13.410 -7.340 -0.048 -14.090 -7.960 -0.048 -13.420 -7.600 -0.049 -13.920 -7.640 
HRCON NEG -0.010   -3.790 -4.010 -0.008   -3.080 -3.220 -0.006   -2.580 -2.820 -0.007   -3.000 -3.140 -0.005   -2.000 -2.170 
ARMGRP POS  0.037  11.210  5.960  0.037  10.830  5.650  0.038  11.710  6.150  0.037  11.010  5.850  0.037  11.270  5.860 
SANCTION NEG -0.010 -3.550 -2.620 -0.010   -3.470 -2.580 -0.009  -3.550 -2.570 -0.010   -3.750 -2.740 -0.009   -3.510 -2.600 
REPUT POS  0.017  4.600  4.120  na    na  na  0.017   4.780  4.230  0.022    7.160  7.300  na     na  na 
TAFEES NEG -0.000 -1.010 -1.490  0.001    4.050 - 5.020 -0.000  -1.250 -1.810  na    na   na -0.001   -3.850 -5.000 
FPSCORE POS  0.002  1.230  1.020  0.004    2.140  1.740  na   na  na  0.005    3.150   2.410  na    na  na 
SIZE POS  0.002  2.930  3.200  na    na  na  0.003   3.750  3.810  na     na   na  na    na  na 
SPREAD NEG -0.000 -0.500 -0.520 -0.000   -1.730 -1.820  na  na na  na     na   na -0.001   -3.400 -3.370 
INDUST NEG -0.004 -1.870 -1.740 -0.005   -1.900 -1.760 -0.003 -1.500 -1.410 -0.004   -1.740  -1.610 -0.004   -1.730 -1.620 
       
NO. of Obs.  1122 1122 1124 1124 1198 
ADJRSQR  0.2016 0.1755 0.1916 0.1911 0.1681 
F-VALUE  29.310 30.830 36.64 40.150 35.560 
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Table 9: Result of the Logistic Regression Analysis - with FRQ  
The table reports the results from logistic regression model specified as: 
LOGIT= β0 + β1 HRCON + β2 SANCTION + β3 REPUT + β4 TAFEES + β5 FPSCORE+ β6 FRQSCORE + β7 SPREAD + β8 SIZE + β9 INDUST + ε; 
Where: LOGIT  is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company file Form SD and zero if it is not; HRCON  is indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the 
period 2011-2013 as reported by KLD database and zero otherwise. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, 
and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, these state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. REPUT is a proxy for 
firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes over the period from 2011 through 2013.  TAFEES is dollar 
amount of the total audit fees from Audit Analytics for the year before the announcement year. FPSCORE is a proxy for firm’s financial performance defined as the factor scores from a 
factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of financial performance. FRQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality utilizing three measures of financial reporting quality. SPREAD is bid-ask spread 
defined as [(the High closing price-the Low closing price)/ (High closing price + the Low closing price)/2]*100. SIZE is the log of total assets for the year before the announcement year. 
INDUST is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and 
televisions) based on Fama-French industry classification scheme. PEST is the parameter estimates of the regression equation. TSTAT is the value of the Test statistics. Pseudo RSQ is the 
Pseudo R-Square.  
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT PEST T-STAT 
Intercept Pos./Neg.  0.135  0.367  0.555  2.448**  1.331 10.480***  0.585  2.591**  0.227  1.037  0.875  2.574**  1.929  7.874*** 
HRCON Positive  0.441  2.992***  0.361  2.653***  0.395  2.926***  0.361  2.658**  0.456  3.406***  0.326  2.508**  0.308  2.155** 
SANCTION Positive   0.040  0.291  0.051  0.372  0.024  0.024  0.050  0.361  0.024  0.178  0.045  0.329  0.025  0.185 
REPUT Negative -0.516 -1.976** -0.537 -2.073** -0.431 -1.692*  na  na -0.276 -1.334  na  na -0.156 -0.709 
TAFEES Positive  0.119  5.086***  0.101  5.435***  0.111  6.011***  0.082  5.231***  na  na  na  na  na  na 
FPSCORE Positive  0.194  2.362**  0.166  2.076**  0.346  4.933***  0.172  2.158**  0.175  2.196**  0.132  1.688*  0.300  3.983*** 
FRQ Positive  0.048  0.517  0.054  0.579  0.060  0.649  0.060  0.643  0.057  0.610  0.063  0.675  0.074  0.805 
SPREAD Positive  0.013  4.252***  0.012  4.035***  na  na  0.011  3.887***  0.015  4.800***  0.013  4.310***  na  na 
SIZE Positive  0.071  1.435  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.098  2.687**  0.140  3.811*** 
INDUST Positive  0.995  7.378***  1.022  7.635***  0.998  7.525***  1.024  7.667***  1.001  7.534***  1.023  7.783***  1.036  7.753*** 
                
N  1600  1600  1600  1600  1600  1600  1600  
0  1017  1017  1017  1017  1017  1017  1017  
1  583  583  583  583  583  583  583  
Pseudo-RSQ  0.1103  0.1091  0.0993  0.1065  0.0864  0.0895  0.079  
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Table 10: Result of the Logistic Regression - without FRQ 
The table reports the results from logistic regression model specified as: 
LOGIT= β0 + β1 HRCON + β2 SANCTION + β3 REPUT + β4 TAFEES + β5 FPSCORE + β6  SPREAD + β7 SIZE + β8  INDUST + ε; 
Where: LOGIT  is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company file Form SD and zero if it is not; HRCON  is indicator variable equal one if the company has a human rights concern over the 
period 2011-2013 as reported by KLD database and zero otherwise. SANCTION is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, 
and St. Petersburg-Florida, and zero otherwise, these state passed regulations to sanction companies with exposure to conflict minerals from obtaining state contracts. REPUT is a proxy for 
firm reputation and it is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company is one of the most admired companies as ranked by Forbes over the period from 2011 through 2013.  TAFEES is dollar 
amount of the total audit fees from Audit Analytics for the year before the announcement year. FPSCORE is a proxy for firm’s financial performance defined as the factor scores from a 
factor analysis utilizing 13 measures of financial performance. SPREAD is bid-ask spread defined as [(the High closing price-the Low closing price)/ (High closing price + the Low closing 
price)/2]*100. SIZE is the log of total assets for the year before the announcement year. INDUST is an indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to Business Equipment’s (computers, 
software, and electronic equipment’s) and Telecommunications (telephone and televisions) based on Fama-French industry classification scheme. PEST is the parameter estimates of the 
regression equation. TSTAT is the value of the Test statistics. Pseudo RSQR is the Pseudo R-Square. N 2406 is the initial number of observation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT PEST TSTAT 
Intercept Pos./Neg.  0.197  0.642  1.280  7.356***  1.781 18.439***  1.289  7.410***  0.935  5.660***  1.150  4.036***  1.933  9.660*** 
HRCON Positive  0.643  5.954***  0.562  5.347***  0.605  5.798***  0.557  5.306***  0.578  5.567***  0.575  5.497***  0.603  5.773*** 
SANCTION Positive   0.125  0.987  0.179  1.421  0.165  1.305  0.176  1.389  0.122  0.969  0.139  1.101  0.125  0.989 
REPUT Negative -0.186 -0.880  -0.239 -1.163 - 0.185  -0.895  na  na -0.473 -2.774***  na  na -0.490 -2.691** 
TAFEES Positive  0.113  7.197***  0.078  6.538***  0.085  7.067***  0.071  6.829***  na  na  na  na  na  na 
FPSCORE Positive  0.216  2.931***  0.149  2.065**  0.269  4.167***  0.149  2.071**  0.153  2.141**  0.137  1.879**  0.275  3.991*** 
SPREAD Positive  0.010  4.435***  0.007  3.369***  na  na  0.007  3.287***  0.010  4.622*** 0.010  4.381***  na  na 
SIZE Positive  0.154  4.219***  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  na  0.037  1.337  0.054  1.928** 
INDUST Positive  0.923  8.418***  0.961  8.794***  0.927  8.548***  0.965  8.828***  0.964  8.901***  0.965  8.893***  0.936  8.691*** 
                
N1  1700  1700  1700  1700  1700  1700  1700  
N2  706  706  706  706  706  706  706  
P-RSQR  0.1030  0.0955  0.0907  0.0949  0.0736  0.0712  0.0662  
83 
 
Appendix A: Regulatory Intervention Timeline to Section 1502 Conflict Minerals 
 May 22, 2008: Senators Samuel Brownback and Richard Durbin introduced to the Senate Finance Committee a 
bill called “Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite ACT of 2008” The main objectives of the bill is to 1) prohibit the 
importation of certain products that contain or are derived from columbite-tantalite or cassiterite mined or 
extracted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and for other purposes. 2) Identification of groups 
that commit human rights crimes under international law and benefits from minerals extraction in DRC. 3. To 
deny the minerals extractions benefits to groups in 2 above if it results in arms or money being transferred 
directly or indirectly to such groups. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills.  
 
Confounding News: The bill (a provision) passed by the Senate as part of a financial reform Bill related to the 
housing crises and the financial market collapse. (Congo Minerals Provision Becomes Part of Financial Bill, 
New York Times, May 21, 2010) 
 
 April 23, 2009: Senators Samuel Brownback, Richard Durbin, and Russ Feingold introduced the “Congo 
Conflict Minerals Act of 2009” (CCMA) to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee to 
address the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. The bill requires annual disclosure to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of activities involving columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, and wolframite from the DRC, and for other 
purposes. The CCMA declares that it is U.S. policy to promote peace and security in the DRC and to (1) monitor 
and stop commercial activities involving the natural resources of the DRC (the minerals columbite-tantalite 
[coltan], cassiterite, wolframite, and gold) that contribute to illegal armed groups and human rights violations 
in the eastern region of the DRC; and (2) Develop stronger governance and economic institutions that can 
facilitate and improve transparency in the cross-border trade involving such natural resources in order to reduce 
exploitation by illegal armed groups and promote local and regional development. 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills. 
 
Confounding News: 1. The US Treasury announced plan to sell $158 billion in short-and long-term securities 
(Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2009). 2. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner reassuring investors that the vast 
majority of banks have more capital than they need, the statement sends DJIA up 127.83 point or 1.6 percent 
(Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2009). 3. A late-day sell off left stocks in the red amid disappointing earnings 
and renewed worry about general Motors bankruptcy. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost more than 110 
points, or 1.4 %, in the last half hours of trading (Wall Street Journal 23, April 2009).  
 
 July 21, 2010: The U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Section 1502 of the Act is a provision related to conflict minerals. The intent of the provision is to deter, through 
increased transparency of companies ‘sourcing practices , the extreme violence and human rights violations in 
the DRC and neighboring countries funded by the exploitation and trade of certain minerals. The term “conflict 
mineral” is defined as: columbite-tantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore from which tantalum is extracted); 
cassarite (the metal ore from which tin is extracted); gold; wolframite (the metal ore from which tungsten is 
extracted); or their derivatives. Additionally, any other mineral or its derivatives could be added if determined 
by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the DRC countries. Section 1502 instructs the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), in consultation with the U.S. Department of State, to promulgate regulations 
requiring certain companies to submit annually a description of measures taken to exercise due diligence on the 
source and chain of custody of conflict minerals. https://www.sec.gov/about/wallstreetreforem. 
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Confounding News: Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act is part of the Wall Street Reform Protection Act which 
includes provisions to enhance the asset backed securitization process, create oversight of credit rating agencies, 
executive compensation and corporate governance reform, Volcker Rule which aims to reduce systemic risk in 
the banking industry, among other provisions.     
 
 September 11, 2010: President Joseph Kabila outlaws all artisanal mining activities in three eastern provinces. 
He ordered the indefinite suspension during a visit to the mining hub town of Walikale; the mining industry 
later confirmed it was with immediate effect. http://thinkafricapress.com/ 
 
 December 15, 2010: the SEC proposed changes to the annual reporting requirements of issuers that file reports 
pursuant to Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to implement Section 1502. The 
proposed rules would require any issuer for which conflict minerals are necessary to the functionality or 
production of a product manufactured, or contracted to be manufactured, by that issuer to disclose in the body 
of its annual report whether its conflict minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining country. If so, that issuer 
would be required to furnish a separate report as an exhibit to its annual report that includes, among other matters, 
a description of the measures taken by the issuer to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of 
its conflict minerals. These due diligence measures would include, but would not be limited to, an independent 
private sector audit of the issuer’s report conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller 
General of the United States. Further, any issuer furnishing such a report would be required, in that report, to 
certify that it obtained an independent private sector audit of its report, provide the audit report, and make its 
reports available to the public on its Internet website. (SEC, 17 CFR PARTS 229 and 249, Release No. 34-6379).  
 
Confounding News: 1. Congress passes the most far-reaching tax bill in a decade, averting across-the-board tax 
increases, enacting new breaks for individuals and businesses and laying a marker for how Washington might 
work in an era of divided government (Wall Street Journal, 16, December 2010). 2. Release of the retail sales 
report pushed stocks to a new two-year high. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose nearly 48 points. 
Furthermore, on Tuesday, the National Federation of Independent Business said its small-business optimism 
index rose 1.5 point in November to 93.2, its highest level since December 2007 (Wall Street Journal, 15, 
December 2010).    
 
 April 7, 2011: California Senator Ellen Corbett introduced bill SB 861, which supports the federal legislation 
on conflict minerals. If this bill passes, publicly traded companies will not be able to sell products to California’s 
government agencies unless they comply with the upcoming disclosure requirements by the Security and 
Exchange Commission.  Senate Bill 861 received bipartisan support, passing out of the Senate Governmental 
Organization Committee on a 9 to 1 vote. Tuesday Senator Corbett receive a letter from 28 investors with assets 
under management of more than $123 billion which points out to the importance of disclosure and accountability 
of companies’ entire value chains. http://www.sourcingnetwork.org.  
 
 May 25, 2011: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued the “OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas”, 
which provides detailed recommendations to help companies respect human rights and avoid contributing to 
conflict through their mineral purchasing decisions and practices. The Due Diligence Guidance is for use by any 
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company potentially sourcing minerals or metals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. It is the only 
international frameworks available to help companies meet their due diligence reporting requirements. The due 
diligence guidance outline procedures to properly identify and assess risks related to the "extraction, trading, 
handling and export of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas" The OECD is an international 
organization with 34 member countries including the United States and its recommendation is binding to all 
members and is endorsed by the US State Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the United 
Nations. www.oecd.org 
 
Confounding News:  1. Stocks registered a third consecutive day of losses after manufacturing data combined 
with worries about Europe's debt-laden countries weighed on investor sentiment. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average finished down 25.05 points, or 0.2%, its lowest close since April 19. The technology-oriented Nasdaq 
Composite fell 12.74 points, or 0.5%.  
 
 July 15, 2011: The US Department of State issued a statement to urging companies to begin to exercise due 
diligence immediately in order to ensure a viable and conflict free supply chain. Under Section 1502 the 
Department is "to provide guidance to commercial entities seeking to exercise due diligence on and formalize 
the origin and chain of custody of conflict minerals used in their products and on their suppliers to ensure that 
conflict minerals used in the products of such suppliers do not directly or indirectly finance armed conflict or 
result in labor or human rights violations."  The Department states that “… it is critical that companies begin 
now to perform meaningful due diligence with respect to conflict minerals. To this end, companies should begin 
immediately to structure their supply chain relationships in a responsible and productive manner to encourage 
legitimate, conflict-free trade, including conflict-free minerals sourced from the DRC and the Great Lakes 
region. Furthermore, the Department specifically endorses the guidance and framework issued by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and encourages companies to draw upon 
this guidance as they establish their due diligence practices. Under this five-step framework, companies should: 
1) Establish strong company management systems; 2) Identify and assess risk in the supply chain; 3) Design 
and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks; 4) Carry out independent third-party audit of supply 
chain due diligence at identified points in the supply chain; and 5) Report on supply chain due diligence. 
http://www.state.gov 
 
 September 16, 2011: The California Legislature passed SB 861, a law that requires public companies to comply 
with the Dodd-Frank provision on conflict minerals if they want to do business with the state of California. Gov. 
Jerry Brown is expected to sign the California bill, says Matt Brown, a spokesman for the Enough Project, a 
group active on the issue. He adds “This is saying that if you are not in compliance, you won’t be able to do 
business with the state of California, which is a huge consumer of electronics and other products. Basically, 
California is taking a step and saying conflict minerals matter.” 
 
 October 3, 2011: St. Petersburg Passes Resolution to Favor Products Free of Congo Conflict Minerals on Oct 
3, 2011. The City of St. Petersburg has passed a resolution changing its purchasing practices on electronics to 
favor products that are free of conflict minerals that are fueling the world's deadliest war in the Congo. 
 
City Councilman Steve Kornell introduced the resolution that calls for the city to “favor verifiably conflict-free 
products” in its purchasing decisions. The action is part of a growing movement by governments and institutions 
to steer away from products that use conflict minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, from mines 
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in eastern Congo that are controlled by armed groups that perpetrate mass atrocities. 
http://www.enoughproject.org/news. 
 
Confounding News: The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged 240.6 points or 2.2% to finish the day 
at 10,913.38.The Standard & Poor 500 (S&P 500) dropped 2.5% to close at 1,131.42. European debt crisis and 
US recessionary fears have threatened the global economy and have significantly dampened investor 
sentiment.www.zaks.com 
 
 October 9, 2011: California Governor Jerry Brown approved SB 861, the California law related to conflict 
materials from the DRC. Sb 861adds Section 10490 to the California Public Contract Code, which precludes 
companies that are in violation of the conflict materials reporting requirements under Section 13(p) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as added by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act) from contracting with state 
agencies in California. Specifically, a company subject to the conflict minerals disclosure requirements under 
Section 13(p) "is ineligible to, and shall not, bid on or submit a proposal for a contract with a state agency for 
goods or services related to products or services that are the reason the company must comply with Section 
13(p)" if the company "has been found to be in violation of Section 13(p)…by final judgment or settlement….". 
http://accountabilityroundtable.org 
 
 May 2, 2012: Governor Martin O’Malley signed the Maryland State Procurement and Congo Conflict Minerals 
Bill (Senate Bill 861) into law. The law addresses the link between the minerals in electronics products and the 
ongoing violence in eastern Congo. It requires that the state of Maryland does not conduct business with 
companies that fail to comply with the federal laws on conflict minerals passed in 2010 as a provision of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act...State Delegate Shane Robinson...said, "Hopefully, more state legislatures 
will pass similar laws that send a message that corporations must be held accountable for social, economic, and 
environmental impacts at home and abroad in order to earn state contracts.” http://business-humanrights.org  
 
 August 22, 2012: the SEC issued a final rule on conflict minerals pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 1502. Section 
1502 added Section 13(p) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to promulgate 
rules requiring issuers with conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of a product 
manufactured by such person to disclose annually whether any of those minerals originated in the DRC or an 
adjoining country. If an issuer’s conflict minerals originated in those countries, Section 13(p) requires the issuer 
to submit a report to the Commission that includes a description of the measures it took to exercise due diligence 
on the conflict minerals’ source and chain of custody. The measures taken to exercise due diligence must include 
an independent private sector audit of the report that is conducted in accordance with standards established by 
the Comptroller General of the United States. Section 13(p) also requires the issuer submitting the report to 
identify the auditor and to certify the audit. In addition, Section 13(p) requires the report to include a description 
of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not “DRC conflict free,” the facilities 
used to process the conflict minerals, the country of 2 origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine 
the mine or location of origin. Section 13(p) requires the information disclosed by the issuer to be available to 
the public on its Internet website. The timeline for SEC-reporting companies to submit conflict minerals 
disclosures to SEC is given in Figure (1) below. http://www.sec.gov 
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 October 19, 2012: the National Association of Manufacturers, US Chamber of Commerce, and Business 
Roundtable (Petitioners) petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review 
of the Conflict Minerals Rule and Section 1502. The Petitioners challenging the SEC’s rule on disclosure of 
the use of conflict minerals and requesting that the new Conflict Minerals Rule be modified or set aside in 
whole or in part. The SEC, Amnesty International USA and Amnesty International Limited intervened as 
respondents in support of the Conflict Minerals Rule and Section 1502. http://www.conflictmineralslaw.com  
 
 March, 26, 2013: which would require Canadian Companies to exercise due diligence due diligence in respect 
of the exploitation and trading of designated minerals originating in the Great Lakes Region of Africa in 
seeking to ensure that no armed rebel organization or criminal entity or public or private security force that 
is engaged in illegal activities or serious human rights abuses has benefited from any transaction involving 
such minerals. http://openparliament.ca/politicians/paul-dewar/ 
 
 July 23, 2013: the U.S. Federal district court for the District of Columbia rejected a challenge brought by 
industry groups to the SEC’s rule requiring disclosure about use of “conflict minerals” The district court 
upheld the Conflict Minerals Rule in full and rejected the industry groups’ argument that Section 1502 
violates companies’ First Amendment rights. A panel of the D.C. Circuit upheld the Rule against most 
challenges by the industry groups, including a challenge to the SEC’s analysis of the Rule’s costs and benefits. 
In light of this decision, companies covered by the rule should continue to work to prepare their first annual 
filing of conflict minerals disclosures, which is due May 31, 2014. In the decision, National Association of 
Manufacturers et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for 
summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC.  
 
Confounding News: 1. Weak manufacturing data in US hurt shares, the standard and Poor’s 500-stock index 
fell 3.14 points, with technology leading six of 10 industry sectors lower. The tech-heavy NASDQ Composite 
Index also fell, dropping 21.11 points. 2. European markets were dragged into negative territory late in the 
session after US manufacturers in the central Atlantic region said activity deteriorated this month (Wall Street 
Journal, 23 July 2013). 
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Appendix B: Conflict Mineral Worldwide Production Distribution in 2009 by Top 5 Countries of Producers 
This table reports the production of Tungsten, Tantalum, Tin, and Gold by the top five producers’ countries as measured by 
metric tons and the percentage of the each country production relative to the total worldwide production. The table also reports 
the DRC production relative to the worldwide production, the total revenue generated from each mineral in millions of US 
dollars and the amount which fund DRC conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://visual.ly/conflict-minerals-3tg 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Production of Conflict Minerals 
Tungsten Tantalum Tin Gold 
Country Production  Country Production  Country Production  Country Production  
China 51000 (83.2%) Brazil 180 (26.9%) China 115000 (44.2%) China 320 (13.1%) 
Russia 2500 (4.1%) Mozambique 113 (16.9%) Indonesia 55000 (21.2%) United States 223 (9.1%) 
Canada 1964 (3.2%) Rwanda 104 (15.5%) Peru 37503 (14.4%) Australia 222 (9.1%) 
Bolivia 19273 (7.4%) DRC 87 (13.1%) Bolivia 19273 (7.4%) South Africa 198 (8.1%) 
Austria & Portugal 900 (1.5%) Australia 81 (12.1%) Brazil 13000 (5.0%) Russia 191 (7.8%) 
World Production 61300 Na. 670 (100%) Na. 260000 (100%) Na. 2450 (100%) 
DRC Production 170 (0.28%) Na. 87 (12.99%) Na. 9400 (3.62%) Na. 2 (0.08%) 
Panel B: Revenue of DRC from Conflict Minerals 
Revenue (DRC) $4.37m Na. $6.36m  Na. $133.48m  Na. $62.60m  
Funding the War  $2.62m  Na. $3.82m Na. $80.09m  Na. $37.56m 
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Appendix C: Description of the Variables utilized in the Study 
Variable Description Source Period Covered 
HRCON Indicator variable equal one if KLD indicate that the company has a human right concern in any of the years from 2011-2013.  KLD  2011-2013 
REPUT Indicator variable equal one if the company is listed by Fortune Magazine as one of the most admired companies and zero otherwise. Fortune 2011-2013 
TAFEES The dollar amount of the total audit fees defined as the audit fees plus non-audit fees Audit Analytics 2013 
AFFEES The dollar amount of the audit fees Audit Analytics 2013 
NAFEES The dollar amount of the non-audit fees Audit Analytics 2013 
SANCTION Indicator variable equal one if the company headquarter is located in the State of California, Maryland, and St. Petersburg-Florida, 
and zero otherwise 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
SPREAD The bid-ask spread defined as the three-year (2011-2013) average of: ((Year-end highest closing price –Year- end lowest closing 
price)/( Year-end highest closing price +Year-end lowest closing price)/2)*100 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP 2011-2013 
INDUST Indicator variable equal 1 if the company belongs to group 6 and 7 categories based on Fama-French (1997) industry classifications. 
Group 6= Business Equipment’s (computers, software, and electronic equipment’s) and group 7 = Telecommunications (telephone 
and televisions) 
Fama-French 2013 
FPSCORE Factor score measuring firm financial performance, summarizing 13 measures of book value and market value based measures. COMPUSTAT 2008-2012 
ROA The average of 2013 four quarter ROA defined as the net income divided by total assets COMPUSTAT 2013 
ROE The average of 2013 four quarter ROE defined as net income divided by shareholders’ equity COMPUSTAT 2013 
ROS The average of 2013 four quarter ROS defined as net income divided by net sales COMPUSTAT 2013 
EVA The economic value added defined as: EVA=EBIT/Total Asset where EBIT=OIADPQ-NOPIQ 
Where EBIT is the earning before interest and taxes, OIADPQ is the quarterly operating income before depreciation, NOPIQ is the 
quarterly non-operating income (expense). 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
EVADA The economic value added after depreciation and amortization defined as:    
  EVADA=EBITDA/Total Asset where EBITDA=OIBDPQ-NOIQ. Where OIADPQ is the quarterly operating income before 
depreciation, NOPIQ is the quarterly non-operating income (expense). 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
EPS Earnings per share(including extraordinary items) COMPUSTAT 2013 
QEARN Proxy for Earnings Quality defined as: QEARN=OANCFY/NI. Where OANCFY is net operating cash flow from operating activities, 
and NI is the net income. 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
TOBQ The Tobin-q ratio defined as: TOBQ = (MV+PSTKQ+DLCQ+DLTTQ)/Total Asset where MV=CSHO*PRCC_C. 
Where MV is the market value of the firm, PSTKQ is the total prefered or preference stock, DLCQ is the amount of debt in current 
liabilities, DLTTQ is the amount of long-term debt, CSHO is the number of common shares outstanding, and PRCC is the end of 
quarter market closing price. 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
MVA Market Value added defined as: MVA=MV-BV-DLCQ-DLTTQ. Where MV is the market value of equity, BV is the book value of 
equity, DLCQ is the amount of debt in current liabilities, and DLTTQ is the amount of long-term debt. 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
EPSG The earnings growth rate in EPS over the previous quarter, which is 
EPSG= (EPSt-EPSt-1)/ EPSt-1. 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
SALEG The sales growth rate over the previous year, which is  
SALEG=(SALEt-SALEt-1)/ SALEt-1 
COMPUSTAT 2013 
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RETH Quarterly rate of return, which is the sum of monthly stock returns over the quarter COMPUSTAT/CRSP 2013 
ABRD Abnormal rate of return, which is the sum of the Difference between the Firms’ Return and value-weighted market return divided by 
the standard deviation of the Firms’ Return 
CRSP 2013 
REPSCORE The factor score measuring companies' reputation COMUSTAT 2013 
FRQ The proxy for companies' financial reporting quality using three measures of financial reporting quality COMPUSTAT-I/B/E/S 2007-2012 
MJON The proxy for FRQ using Jones model COMPUSTAT-I/B/E/S 2011-2012 
JONMPM The proxy for FRQ using modified Jones model COMPUSTAT-I/B/E/S 2011-2012 
FLOSIC The proxy for FRQ using cash flow forecast (FLOS) model COMPUSTAT-I/B/E/S 2011-2012 
MVEQ (M$) Market Value of Equity (US Dollars) COMPUSTAT 2007-2013 
ASSETS (M$) Total Assets (US Dollars)  COMPUSTAT 2007-2013 
CZONE1 Indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone and zero otherwise. Form SD (EDGAR) 2014 
CZONE2 Indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that it source minerals from conflict zone or the source of its 
minerals is undetermined and zero otherwise 
Form SD (EDGAR) 2014 
ARMGRP Indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals do not support armed 
groups and zero otherwise. 
Form SD (EDGAR) 2014 
ARMGRP2 Indicator variable equal 1 if the company disclosed in its Form SD that the proceeds from its conflict minerals is undeterminable on 
wither it support armed groups or not and zero otherwise. 
Form SD (EDGAR) 2014 
SIZE Log of total assets for the year before the announcement year  COMPUSTAT 2013 
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Exhibit 1: Flowchart of Conflict Mineral Disclosure by SEC  
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Exhibit 2: Form SD 2014 Disclosure for Intel Corporation 
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Exhibit 2: Form SD 2014 Disclosure for Intel Corporation (continued)  
94 
 
Exhibit 3: Form SD 2013 Disclosure for VEECO Instruments Inc. 
